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Abstract
Chapter 1: Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement
Many developing countries are financially constrained and therefore have to rely on inter-
national capital flows to finance economic activity. Empirical evidence shows that Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) as a percentage of total capital flows is higher for less developed
countries compared to more developed countries. This chapteruses a dynamic contract-
ing model with human capital to explain why less developed countries receive a greater
percentage of capital flows as FDI. I analytically show that countries that are financially
constrained have a higher share of FDI in total capital flows, and that the share of FDI in
total capital flows is increasing in human capital flows. In addition, the positive association
between the share of FDI in total capital flows and human capital flows is decreasing in the
degree of financial constraints. I construct a measure of intangible assets of FDI and find
empirical support for the analytical results.
Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization, Firm Heterogeneity, and Unemployment: An Em-
pirical Investigation
This chapter is a joint work with Yoto V. Yotov. We provide empirical evidence for the
interaction between firm-level total factor productivity and trade liberalization as key de-
terminants of firm-level job destruction caused by trade. Employing US firm-level data, we
find strong empirical support for the following: a) All else equal, a one percent increase
in total factor firm productivity decreases trade-induced layoffs by 32%; b) An additional
percent of trade liberalization increases the number of firm-level trade-induced layoffs by
2%; c) Trade liberalization results in an increase in the minimum level of productivity re-
quired for domestic production; d) Trade liberalization lowers the minimum productivity
threshold required for exporting; e) The increase due to trade liberalization in the minimum
productivity threshold for domestic production is larger than the absolute decrease in the
export productivity threshold.
Chapter 3: Do Audit Fees Influence Credit Risk and Asymmetric Information Prob-
lems? Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market
This chapter is a joint work with Lewis W. Gaul. We examine whether an increase in
the demand for auditing services is associated with a decrease in borrowers’ credit risk
and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market. In the syndicated
loan market, potential accounting errors exacerbate credit risk and asymmetric information
problems. The purpose of financial statement audits is to provide reasonable assurance that
accounting records are free from material errors. We hypothesize that if auditees face an
upward sloping supply curve for auditing services, an increase in the demand for auditing
services increases both the equilibrium price and quantity of auditing services purchased.
We interpret the equilibrium quantity of auditing services as the number of auditing hours
billed and the price of auditing services as the hourly fee. We assert that an increase in the
quantity of auditing services purchased reduces the likelihood of an accounting error be-
cause auditors exert more effort verifying the accuracy of accounting records. We present
empirical evidence that a demand-induced increase in audit fees is associated with syndi-
cated loans with lower interest rate spreads and shorter maturity lengths, which we interpret
as evidence consistent with the assertion that these audit fee increases reduce credit-risk and
asymmetric information problems. We empirically identify an increase in the demand for
auditing services with instrumental variables that are intended to capture shifts in the de-
mand curve for auditing services, rather than shifts in the supply curve for auditing services.
In addition, we find that audit fees are positively associated with the number of lenders in
loan syndicates, but are unable to attribute this association to an increase in the demand for
auditing services.
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1 Introduction
Many developing countries are financially constrained, and therefore have to rely on inter-
national capital flows to finance economic activity.1 Empirical evidence shows that Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) as a percentage of total capital flows is higher for less developed
countries compared to more developed countries.2 This paper uses a dynamic contracting
model with human capital to explain why less developed countries receive a greater per-
centage of capital flows as FDI. I show that countries that are financially constrained have
a higher share of FDI in total capital flows, and that the share of FDI in total capital flows
is increasing in human capital flows. In addition, the positive association between the share
of FDI in total capital flows and human capital flows is decreasing in the degree of financial
constraints.
In my model, international contracts are not perfectly enforceable, and when an interna-
tional investor makes an investment in a host country, it faces the risk that the investment
might be confiscated. The host country may gain from confiscating the output in the short
run; however, it may be unable to attract future foreign investments as a consequence.
Hence, any contract between the international investor and the host country must be self
enforcing, which implies that countries should not have incentives to renege upon the con-
tract.
The main assumption of the model is that FDI is inalienable from human capital invest-
ment, which means that foreign investors provide the host country with intangible assets
necessary to realize the full benefits of FDI. For example, these intangible assets may in-
clude managerial and entrepreneurial skills, and engineering experience. The physical and
human capital aspects of FDI differ simply because, in case of a default, physical capital
can be confiscated by the host country while intangible human capital assets cannot be con-
fiscated. If the host country decides to expropriate FDI flows, then the inalienable assets
1These capital flows can be divided into two main groups: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and non-FDI,
where non-FDI corresponds to foreign portfolio flows.
2See (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias 2000) and (Albuquerque 2003).
are no longer available. Therefore, when the host country considers confiscating foreign
capital, it weighs the benefits and costs. The benefit of confiscating physical capital flows
is gaining ownership of all investment returns, while the cost is that all subsequent invest-
ment returns are lower because human capital cannot be confiscated, and the host country
loses all future foreign capital investments. As a consequence, from a host country’s point
of view, it would not be as advantageous to expropriate FDI compared to other types of
capital flows given that human capital is lost when FDI is expropriated.
In the limited commitment environment of my model, I analytically show that when a host
country is financially constrained, the expected loss for the international investor on FDI
flows is lower than the expected loss on non-FDI flows due to the intangible part of FDI.
Hence, the international investor finds it optimal to invest a greater share of FDI flows in
total capital flows to financially constrained countries, and there is a positive association
between human capital flows and FDI share. In addition, the positive association between
the share of FDI in total capital flows and human capital flows is decreasing in the degree
of financial constraints.
To test the analytical predictions of the model empirically, I construct a measure of intangi-
ble assets of FDI following (Coe and Helpman 1995) . Using an unbalanced panel dataset,
I find strong empirical support for the following propositions: a) The more a country is
financially constrained, the higher the share of FDI in total capital flows; b) There is a
positive relation between human capital flows and the share of FDI flows; c) As the degree
of financing constraints decrease, the positive association between human capital and FDI
becomes weaker.
I concentrate on the capital flows from developed countries to developing countries be-
cause the impact of capital flows on economies is not uniform across different levels of
development. (Blonigen and Wang 2005) show that the FDI experiences of less devel-
oped countries are systematically different from those of developed countries, and pooling
rich and poor countries in analysis leads to incorrect inferences about the effect of FDI on
growth and domestic investment.
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My paper contributes to the theoretical literature on FDI by combining a model of FDI with
human capital in a dynamic contracting model. It is important to examine FDI flows in a
dynamic environment to reflect international investors’ long lasting interest.3 In a static set-
ting, (Eaton and Gersovitz 1984) analyzed the level of FDI under the risk of expropriation
and found that the threat of expropriation lowers the welfare of the host country. (Thomas
and Worrall 1994) analyzed the size of FDI flows in a dynamic setting in which investors
and host countries engage in self enforcing contracts. They found that there is under-
investment at the beginning of a contract, but investment increases over time and reaches
the efficient level. (Albuquerque 2003) extends Thomas and Worrall’s (1994) framework to
allow for FDI and non-FDI flows and utilizes the idea that the presence of intangible assets
would limit the host country’s incentives to expropriate the investment.
My paper contributes to the empirical literature on FDI by providing evidence on the ef-
fects of expropriation risk that affects the international investor’s decision to invest in less
developed countries. Expropriation is defined as the forced divestment of equity ownership
of a foreign direct investor.4 Given the definition, (Kobrin 1984) collects data on the ex-
propriations of foreign firms in 79 less developed countries from 1960-1979, while (Minor
1994) analyzes expropriation acts from 1980-1992, extending the work of (Kobrin 1984).
These studies find that there has been a total of 575 expropriation acts in the 1960-1992
period, mainly concentrated in the agriculture, mining, petroleum, manufacturing and fi-
nance industries. (Kobrin 1984) finds that the outright nationalization of sectors such as
oil, mining and petroleum, where foreign ownership was not compatible with autonomous
3(IMF 1993) defines FDI as ”an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating out-
side of the economy of the investor. Further, in cases of FDI, the investor’s purpose is to gain an effective
voice in the management of the enterprise.” (OECD 1996) emphasizes that ”The most important characteris-
tic of FDI, which distinguishes it from foreign portfolio investment, is that it is undertaken with the intention
of exercising control over an enterprise.”
4Kobrin (1980, 1984) identifies four different kinds of expropriation: Formal Expropriation, where the
host country’s government directly takes over the foreign property under the local law; Intervention, where
the transfer of ownership is forced, most of the time sudden and unannounced; Forced Sale, where the host
government uses coercive power to force foreign investors to involuntarily sell their ownership; and Contract
Renegotiation, where the host government forces renegotiation of the initial contract to force a transfer of
ownership.
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economic control or national security, was complete by 1975.5 I show that even though
international investors might not face the same risks of nationalization as in the 1960s and
1970s, expropriation risk still affects the decisions of international investors.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents and analyzes the solution to the the model. Section 4 presents the econo-
metric model, data description, estimation, empirical results, and sensitivity analysis. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 The Problem
The basic framework builds on (Thomas and Worrall 1994) and (Albuquerque 2003). A
host country receives two types of capital flows from the international investor to produce
his consumption good. One is FDI flows, which includes physical capital, k f , and human
capital, h f . The physical part of FDI can only be operated with foreign human capital. The
other type of capital flow the host country receives is non-FDI flows, ko, which does not
require foreign human capital to be operated. Human capital is a proxy for the intangible
part of FDI, so if the host country decides to confiscate output, he will be able to keep
the physical capital, but the human capital portion will be lost and will not be used in
production. I also suggest that the host country will not be able to receive capital flows
in the future, and will have to live in autarky forever. Similarly, the international investor
has the option of withdrawing her investment, and not investing in the host country in the
future.
I assume that the host country is risk averse and the international investor is risk neutral.
So, the international investor will invest in the host country as long as she receives the
gross rate of return (1+ r) on physical capital, the wage rate (w) on human capital, and
5See also (Kobrin 1980) and (Minor 1994).
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the physical capital is not expropriated by the host country. After the investor makes the
investment decision, an aggregate productivity shock, s, is realized that determines the
quantity of output produced. Then, the host country decides how much to consume, cs,
out of the output produced, and the international investor will retain the profit, pis, after
transferring cs to the host country and paying for the factor inputs.
There is no informational asymmetry between the international investor and the host coun-
try. However, the host country may decide to confiscate the output, and likewise the in-
ternational investor may choose to withdraw her investment. These actions might lead to
short run gains, but they might have large costs in the long run. The host country gains
ownership of physical capital from FDI flows and non-FDI flows, however he will not be
able attract any further capital flows. So, at the beginning of the period the international
investor and the host country must agree on a self-enforcing long term contract, where the
international investor invests k f , ko, and h f , maximizes her profit, taking into account that
the host country has an incentive to default. The international investor has to offer the host
country a minimum consumption level, cs, for the current period, and a lifetime utility, Vs,
which is the discounted lifetime utility for the host country so that the host country will
stay in the contract. Both the consumption and the lifetime utility of the host country will
depend on the aggregate shock that is going to be realized. The self-enfocing contract will
specify how much the host country will consume and what will be his lifetime utility for
each state s that could be realized. The sequence of events at any time t is illustrated in
Figure 1.
I assume that the host country and the international investor discount the future at the same
rate 1/(1+ r), and the international investor maximizes the expected value of her profits:
B(V ) = max
cs,k f ,ko,h f
E
[
pis+
1
1+ r
B(Vs) s−1
]
, (1)
where s−1 is the previous period’s aggregate shock, and V is the promised discounted life-
time utility of the host country determined in the previous period. Basically the utility of
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Figure 1: Timing of the events
the international investor is the expected discounted value of her profits, and her utility de-
pends on the host country’s discounted lifetime utility. V depends on current consumption
of the host country, cs, and his continuation value for the next period, Vs, contingent on
each state s that can be realized in a given period:
V = E
[
ln(cs)+
1
1+ r
Vs s−1
]
, (2)
and Vs≥Vmin with Vmin >−∞, where this constraint is introduced to place a lower bound to
the utility of the host country. Equation (2) is the promise-keeping constraint, which states
that the lifetime discounted utility of the host country will be equal to the promised value
V that is determined in the previous state s−1. The international investor takes V as a state
variable and decides how much to invest, how much the host country will consume, and the
continuation value Vs for the host country.
Per-period profit for the international investor is defined as:
pis = s A
{[
(1−a) hεf +a kεf
] 1
ε
}α f
+ s kαoo −wh f − (1+ r)(k f + ko)− cs. (3)
Total output in the economy comes from two investment projects: one using FDI flows -
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physical capital (k f ) and human capital (h f ); and the other using non-FDI flows (ko). In the
production function that utilizes FDI, physical and human capital are aggregated in CES
fashion with an elasticity of substitution σ ≡ 1/(1− ε). This means that as ε approaches
zero, σ approaches unity, and the production function becomes Cobb-Douglas where physi-
cal capital and human capital are complements. As ε approaches one, σ approaches infinity,
and the production function becomes linear, where physical capital and human capital are
perfect substitutes.
I restrict ε<α f , which is a restriction on the complementarity among human capital portion
of FDI, physical capital portion of FDI and non-FDI flows. When ε < α f , human capital
of FDI is more complementary to physical capital of FDI than to non-FDI.
Many host countries offer special tax incentives or subsidies for international investors
to attract FDI. A is a constant to capture these benefits and whenever A > 1, there are
tax advantages of FDI for the international investor. Eventually, total output in the host
country is divided between payments to the factors of production and the transfer to the
host country. I assume that all capital flows depreciate fully after each period for analytical
tractability.
As the production takes place in the host country, he has the option to confiscate output
and default on the contract. In turn this leads to the participation constraint for the host
economy:
ln(c)+
1
1+ r
Vs ≥Uaut(k f ,ko,s) (4)
for every s ∈ S, where S is the space of possible realizations of s. The participation con-
straint basically states that not expropriating should yield a higher utility to the host coun-
try than defaulting on the contract. In case of default, the host country no longer receives
FDI or non-FDI flows, and the function Uaut(.) gives the future discounted value of the
host country’s utility under autarky. This condition will generate endogenous barriers to
international capital flows by limiting the size of k f and ko. Likewise, the participation
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constraint for the foreign investor requires that the utility of the foreign investor which is
equal to her expected present discounted value of profits should always be non-negative to
prevent losses, which implies:
B(Vs)≥ 0 for all s ∈ S. (5)
In summary, the international investor and the host country agree on a self-enforcing long
term contract, where the international investor maximizes her profits, makes the investment
at the beginning of the period promising the host country the consumption cs for this period,
and promising for the next period the continuation value Vs contingent on the state s that is
to be realized. Next, upon the realization of the aggregate productivity shock, s, the output
is produced and both parties decide whether to continue the contract or not. If the host
country decides to default and confiscate the output, he will not receive any further capital
flows in the future. As is customary, I assume that the aggregate shock follows a first order
autoregressive process:
ln st+1 = ρ lnst + εt+1, and εt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2ε).
2.2 Value under Autarky
To calculate the value for the host country when it defaults and stays in autarky thereafter, I
make the following assumptions: (1) Default occurs on both FDI and non-FDI flows simul-
taneously; (2) During the period when default occurs, foreign human capital is withdrawn,
and is no longer employed. The FDI technology is operated without the human capital
and there is a loss in FDI output; (3) After default, even though there is no capital flow-
ing to the host country, the host country can still operate the existing physical capital and
produce output using the technology of the non-FDI investment project. Following these
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assumptions, I can write the value of the host country under autarky as
Uaut(k f ,ko,s) = max
ko,c≥0
[
ln(c)+
1
1+ r
EU(ko,s)
]
subject to the resource constraint
A s
(
a1/ε k f
)α f
+ s kαoo = c+ k
′
o.
Once the host country defaults, the Bellman equation under autarky is:
U(ko,s) = max
k′o,c≥0
[
ln(skαoo − k′o)+
1
1+ r
EU(k′o,s′)
]
.
The assumptions of log-utility and full depreciation allow me to write the present dis-
counted value of defaulting on the contract and staying under autarky as:
Uaut(k f ,ko,s) = d0+d1 ln
[
A
(
a1/ε k f
)α f
+ kαoo
]
+d2 ln(s), (6)
where the constants d0, d1, and d2 are all positive and 0 < ε< α f .
I also put the restriction ε > 0, because when the human capital is withdrawn (i.e h f = 0)
the utility under autarky will not depend on physical capital portion of FDI, and there will
be no incentive for the host country to default on FDI.
3 Solution to the Dynamic Problem
The international investor’s problem can be written as the maximization of the expected dis-
counted value of profits (Equation (7)), subject to the promise-keeping constraint (Equation
(8)), participation constraint for the host country (Equation (9)), the participation constraint
for the international investor (Equation (10)), and the lower bound for the host utility con-
straint (Equation (11)):
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B(V ) = max
cs,k f ,ko,h f
E
[
pis+
1
1+ r
B(Vs) s−1
]
, (7)
pis = s A
((
(1−a) hεf +a kεf
) 1
ε
)α f
+ s kαoo −wh f − (1+ r)(k f + ko)− cs,
V = E
[
ln(cs)+
1
1+ r
Vs s−1
]
, (8)
ln(cs)+
1
1+ r
Vs ≥Uaut(k f ,ko,s) ∀s ∈ S, (9)
B(Vs)≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, (10)
Vs ≥Vmin ∀s ∈ S, (11)
where Uaut(.) is defined in Equation (6). I denote σ, ϕsµs, ϕs φs1+r , and ϕs
τs
1+r as the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the constraints, (8), (9), (10), and (11) respectively, where ϕs is
the probability of state s occuring given that state s−1 has occurred in the previous period.
The first order conditions for the investor’s problem with respect to cs, Vs, h f , k f , and ko,
and the envelope condition are, respectively:
cs = σ+µs ∀s ∈ S, (12)
B′(Vs) =−σ+µs+ τs1+φs ∀s ∈ S, (13)
ϕs sAα f (1−a)
(
(1−a)hεf +a kεf
)α f
ε −1
hε−1f = w ∀s ∈ S, (14)
ϕs sAα f a
(
(1−a)hεf +a kεf
)α f
ε −1
kε−1f =
1+ r+ϕs µs Uautk f (k f ,ko,s) ∀s ∈ S, (15)
ϕs sαo kαo−1o = 1+ r+ϕs µs U
aut
ko (k f ,ko,s) ∀s ∈ S, (16)
B′(V ) =−σ (17)
together with the complementary slackness conditions (omitted). In equations (15) and
(16), the marginal productivity levels of physical FDI flows and non-FDI flows are equal to
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the risk free return, (1+ r), plus a default premium, which measures the marginal cost of
higher incentives to default caused by a marginal increase in capital. These two equations
define the financing constraints of the host economy. When the host country’s participation
constraint is binding (i.e. µs > 0), then the host country faces a positive default premium.
If the host country is not financially constrained (i.e. µs = 0), then both the physical capital
flows earn their marginal products.
3.1 First Best
When there is no enforcement problem, the participation constraints of the host country,
(Equation 9) and the international investor (Equation. 10) are no longer needed. By setting
µs = 0, I show that the first best solution is such that:
Proposition 1 (i) cFBs (V ) = σFB, σFB =−BFB′(V ) ; and (ii) cFBs is a non-decreasing func-
tion of V.
Under the first-best solution, consumption is equal to the slope of the Pareto frontier i.e.,
cs = c = σFB = −BFB′(V ), hence it depends on the promised utility V , but not on the
aggregate shock s. The returns to both physical capital flows (Equations 15 and 16) are
equalized, and the optimal levels of (h f ,k f ,ko), denoted with superscript FB, solves;
ϕs s Aα f (1−a)
(
(1−a)+a
(
kFBf
hFBf
)ε)α fε −1(
hFBf
)α f−1
= w , (18)
ϕs s Aα f a
(
(1−a)
(
hFBf
kFBf
)ε
+a
)α f
ε −1(
kFBf
)α f−1
= 1+ r , (19)
ϕs sαo
(
kFBo
)αo−1
= 1+ r . (20)
There is no default risk associated with physical capital flows, and the marginal products
of physical capital flows are equal. Also, the ratio of the marginal product of human capital
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and physical FDI flows gives us the relation between the two as:
kFBf
hFBf
=
(
w
1+ r
a
1−a
) 1
1−ε
. (21)
This states that the ratio of human capital to physical FDI flows is constant and does not
depend on the aggregate shock s.
3.2 States when the Participation Constraint Binds
When the participation constraint of the host country is binding (i.e. µs > 0), there is a
default premium on both physical capital flows, which lead to a reduction of the level of
physical FDI and non-FDI flows and a deviation from the first-best level of human capital.
The following proposition summarizes the relation between the first-best levels of k f , ko,
and h f and the optimal levels in the imperfect enforcement environment:
Proposition 2 (i) The ratio of physical FDI flows to human capital is lower than the first
best: k∗f /h
∗
f < k
FB
f /h
FB
f , (ii) physical FDI flows, non-FDI flows, and human capital are
below their first best levels: k∗f < k
FB
f , k
∗
o < k
FB
o , and h
∗
f < h
FB
f .
Proof. In Appendix. 3
The first part of the proposition states that there is a decline in physical FDI per unit of
human capital. This also implies that the change in the level of human capital from the
first-best is smaller than the change in physical FDI flows, hFBf /h
∗
f < k
FB
f /k
∗
f . The reason
for this difference stems from the possibility that the host country may confiscate output
and will keep the current physical FDI flow, however the human capital can be recovered
by the international investor.
The second part of the proposition states that when the participation constraint binds, there
is under investment in the host country, which is due to the possibility that the host country
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may default on the contract. Hence, there is a deviation of returns from marginal products,
and the extent of the default premium on physical capital flows depends on µs, Uautk f and
Uautko . The following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 The default premium on physical FDI flows is lower than the default pre-
mium on non-FDI flows if α f /ε−1 > 0.
Replacing the values for Uautk f and U
aut
ko in equations (15) and (16) and rearranging yields:
1+ r
MPK f
= 1−
 1
1+ 1−aa
(
h f
k f
)ε

α f
ε −1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
ϕs µs d1
s
(
Aa
α f
ε k
α f
f + k
αo
o
) , (22)
1+ r
MPKo
= 1− ϕs µs d1
s
(
Aa
α f
ε k
α f
f + k
αo
o
) , (23)
where MPK f is the marginal product of physical FDI flows and MPKo is the marginal prod-
uct of non-FDI flows. As can be seen from these two equations, the marginal products of
both physical capital flows will deviate from the gross return 1+ r if the participation con-
straint of the host country is binding, i.e., µs > 0. Moreover, if the participation constraint
binds, the returns of capital flows will differ if and only if Ω 6= 1. The default premium on
physical FDI flows is less than the default premium on non-FDI flows as long as MPK f is
less than MPKo, i.e., Ω< 1.6 And Ω is smaller than 1 if α f /ε−1 > 0, where the last con-
dition is a constraint on the complementarity between human capital and physical capital
flows as mentioned earlier. If human capital is more complementary to physical FDI flows
than non-FDI flows, the default premium on FDI flows is smaller than the default premium
on non-FDI flows. One should also notice that if FDI flows did not have an intangible part,
i.e., if the share of human capital, 1−a, were zero, then the default premiums on both FDI
flows and non-FDI flows would be the same. Hence, one can establish the following:
6Proof in Appendix.
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Proposition 4 (i) A higher h∗f /k
∗
f will be associated with a lower Ω; (ii) The share of
FDI flows in total capital flows will be higher than in the first-best when α f = αo and
α f /ε−1 > 0.
Proof. In Appendix. 3
The first part of the proposition states that when the default premium on physical FDI
flows is lower than the default premium on non-FDI flows, an increase in human capital
per physical FDI flows implies a decrease in Ω, and hence a bigger discrepancy between
default premia. This makes it more profitable for the international investor to invest more
heavily in FDI flows. Therefore, an increase in human capital flow implies a higher share of
FDI. Likewise, if the default premium on FDI flows is higher than the default premium on
non-FDI flows, an increase in the human capital per physical FDI implies a decrease in Ω.
As Ω is approaching unity, there will be a lower discrepancy between default premia. This
will imply that an international investor could decrease the difference between the physical
capital returns by increasing the human capital flow per FDI flow.
Proposition 2 states that when we move from First Best to an Imperfect Enforcement Envi-
ronment, i.e, if a country is financially constrained, there will be a decrease in the amount
of capital it can attract from foreign investors. The second part of Proposition 4 states that
when a country is financially constrained, the share of FDI flows in total capital flows will
be higher, under the assumption that the production technologies share the same α.
4 Empirical Work
In this section I test the predictions in Proposition 4: that the share of FDI is higher for
countries that are more financially constrained, and that there is a positive association be-
tween human capital flowing into a host country and FDI. The main regression equation to
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be estimated is as follows:
kit = β1+ α︸︷︷︸
+
Rating Dummiesit + β2︸︷︷︸
+
Spilloverit +
β3︸︷︷︸
−
Spilloverit ∗Ratingit + γ Controlsit + vi+ eit . (24)
Here kit represents the share of net FDI inflows in private capital flows in country i at time
t, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Following (Albuquerque 2003), I
use Moody’s sovereign credit ratings as a measure of financing constraints and use them
as dummies (Rating Dummiesit) in the regression. To proxy the human capital that is
embedded in FDI flows, I created a spillover variable (Spilloverit), following (Coe and
Helpman 1995), which will be explained below. They also use this variable as a proxy
for the international research and development spillovers coming through FDI. If spillovers
are sizeable, one would expect that the share of FDI would be larger. I also included an
interaction term between spillovers and ratings to capture the effect of financial constraints
on the share of FDI through spillovers. As ratings improve (hence as financial constraints
are relaxed), the positive effect of spillovers will be reduced. I expect that if spillovers are
large, financial constraints would be less binding, and the share of FDI would decline since
the country would be able to attract larger non-FDI capital flows.
As main control variables, I use GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted in constant 2000 dollars) to
control for country size. As other studies noted financial development is also an important
factor in explaining foreign capital flows.7 Hence, I include a stock market development
measure and a banking sector development measure to capture different aspects of financial
development. To control for stock market development, I use either the ratio of the total
value of shares traded on the stock market to GDP, or the ratio of stock market capitalization
to GDP. Both of these measures are taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).
To capture banking sector development, I use the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP or the
ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, from (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
7See (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek 2004)
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Levine 2000). To control for the level of human capital in the host country, I use average
years of schooling, Schooling, from the (Barro and Lee 2000) dataset . Finally to measure
trade openness, Openness, I use the total share of exports and imports in GDP from WDI.
As mentioned above, I use Moody’s sovereign credit ratings as a measure of financing
constraints. Moody’s foreign currency ratings are classified as Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B,
Caa, Ca, C, and in each category there is a number assigned 1, 2, 3 from high to low rank,
which I aggregated. Aaa rating is considered to identify countries that are not financially
constrained and refers to the first-best solution in the theoretical model. It is taken as the
reference category, and not included in the regression. This implies that going from an Aaa
rating to a lower rating should imply a higher FDI share, hence a positive coefficient on the
rating dummies.
Figure 2 shows the association between the share of FDI flows in total capital flows and
countries’ credit ratings. As can be seen, there is a negative association between credit
rating and the share of FDI. A lower rating implies that a country is more financially con-
strained and faces a higher default premium on both types of capital flows. Moreover, as
the default premium on FDI is lower, the country ends up having a larger share of FDI
compared to countries that are less financially constrained and enjoy higher ratings.
Following (Coe and Helpman 1995) the proxy for the international research and develop-
ment spillovers is:
Spilloverit =∑
j
s jit ∗ rd jt (25)
where the subscript i refers to the host country, j refers to the international investor (a G7
country), and t refers to the time period. Given that most of R&D takes place in G7 coun-
tries, I consider the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) and business enterprise
expenditure on R&D (BERD) in G7 countries as the main source of human capital flows.8,9
8Also, the data on the FDI inflow shares for individual countries was very limited. As a sensitivity check,
I also consider a simple average of the R&D stocks in G7 countries instead of a weighted sum.
9The calculations for R&D stocks are in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Average share of net FDI inflows in total capital inflows by sovereign rating
So, the inflow of R&D into country i in year t, rd jt , is a weighted sum of the real R&D
stocks (rd jt) in G7 countries. The weights s jit are calculated as the FDI inflow from a G7
country j into the host country, as a share of total FDI flows into host country i from all
G7 countries. The relation between spillovers and the share of FDI in total capital flows is
presented in Figure 3. The relationship does not appear to be linear, so I experiment with
the square of the variable in the regression as a sensitivity check.
The data set is an unbalanced panel data set with 44 countries, over the years 1981-2004 due
to missing observations in the data. For the estimation, I experiment with both random and
fixed effects. In Table 1 the first two columns show the main relation between credit ratings
and FDI shares for fixed and random effects, respectively. As expected, the coefficients on
the rating dummies are significant and positive, implying that moving from the rating Aaa
to a lower rating is associated with an increase in the share of FDI flows.
The third column of Table 1 uses GERD for the calculation of spillover effects and the
fourth column uses BERD. I also include Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP, Liq-
uid Liabilities / GDP, and GDP as additional control variables. An increase in the R&D
spillover measure implies a significantly higher share of FDI. However, the negative and
18
Figure 3: Average share of net FDI inflows in total capital inflows and Spillovers
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significant coefficients on the interaction terms mean that as spillovers increase, a higher
rating is associated with a lower share of FDI. In other words, when foreign human capital
increases, the positive effect of spillovers on the share of FDI is reduced through higher
ratings. Stock market development has a positive and significant impact on the share of
FDI, but banking sector development has no significant effect. Finally, GDP has a negative
and significant effect on the share of FDI. In columns 5 and 5, I replicate my analysis in
columns 3 and 4 using random effects. The estimation results are still significant and have
the expected signs.
In Table 2 I use additional control variables to test my hypothesis using fixed effects regres-
sions. In columns 1 and 2 I include openness and schooling as additional control variables.
The main results do not change: lower ratings imply an increased share of FDI and higher
spillovers imply higher FDI shares. However, I still have a significant and negative coef-
ficient on the interaction term. Stock market development has a positive and significant
influence on the FDI share, but banking development still has no significant effect. GDP
has a significant and negative impact on the share of FDI, in line with my previous find-
ings. Openness has a significant and positive coefficient, implying that if a country is more
open to trade, it has a higher share of FDI. Schooling does not have a significant effect. In
columns 3 and 4, I replicate the analysis using Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks /
GDP instead of Liquid Liabilities / GDP, with similar findings. Next, in columns 5 and 6,
I replicate the analysis using Market Capitalization as a measure of stock market develop-
ment and obtain similar results.
In Table 3 I replicate the analysis in Table 2, but this time using random effects. I also
check the validity of the random effects model by employing Hausman Tests between fixed
effects and random effects for each regression.10 I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The random effects results are similar
to those in Table 2, but there is a gain in significance. Liquid Liabilities / GDP has a
10Results are available upon request.
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significant and negative effect on the FDI share. I also find that stock market development
has a positive impact on the FDI share, whereas banking sector development has a negative
effect or no effect at all. What is surprising is that the Schooling variable which captures
the education level in the host country is positive but do not have a significant effect.
I also experimented by putting the square of the spillover variable in the regression based on
the seemingly non-linear relation between the FDI share and the spillover measure in Figure
3. The squared term has a negative and significant effect and the interaction between rating
and the spillover is still negative and significant. This finding implies that higher levels
of spillovers have a diminishing influence on the share of FDI flows. Schooling variable
again does not have a significant sign. This might be due to the fact that there might be a
relation between the education level of the host country which is not explicitly modeled in
this paper, the human capital spillovers from FDI and the share of FDI.
5 Conclusion
Using a dynamic contracting model with human capital, I show that when intangible as-
sets that are embedded in FDI flows, but not in non-FDI flows, the composition of capital
flows to developing countries is altered. I assume that foreign investors provide the host
country with intangible assets such as managerial services, organizational capabilities, and
engineering experience, together with physical capital such as plants, equipment and inven-
tories. The physical and human capital aspects of FDI differ because physical capital can
be confiscated by the host country but human capital cannot. Therefore, the host country
has to weigh benefits and costs when making default decisions. The host country may gain
from confiscating the output in the short run. However, all subsequent investment returns
are lower because human capital cannot be confiscated, and the host country loses all fu-
ture foreign capital investments. Hence, the risk premium on FDI flows is lower than the
risk premium on non-FDI flows, and the share of FDI flows in total capital flows is higher
for more financially constrained countries. In addition, there is a positive association be-
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tween human capital flows and the share of FDI flows, and the positive association between
human capital and FDI becomes weaker as degree of financing constraints decrease.
To test the empirical predictions of the model, I constructed a measure of intangible as-
sets in FDI following (Coe and Helpman 1995). Using an unbalanced panel dataset, I find
empirical support for the following propositions: a) More financially constrained countries
have a higher share of FDI in total capital flows; b) There is a positive association between
human capital flows and the share of FDI in total capital flows; c) The positive associa-
tion between human capital flows and FDI flows is weaker for less financially constrained
countries.
Future research might enrich the model by explicitly modeling the human capital in the
host country and and examining how it might affect the association between human capital
spillovers and the share of FDI. There might be a direct transfer and diffusion of technol-
ogy and management to host country nationals.Through human capital spillovers, the host
country may gain enough skills such that there may be a tendency for host governments
to perceive the need to exert increased control over foreign investors and an improvement
in their capability to do so. This might imply that the host country may find it optimal to
default. On the other hand, spillovers from foreign human capital may imply an increase in
expected future gains from FDI flows, which might provide further incentive for the host
country not to default. So, a country with large spillovers coming from FDI might have a
lower default premium on FDI. There are two opposing effects and depending on the size
of the spillovers, there might be an increase or decrease in the likelihood of default.
25
References
Albuquerque, R.: 2003, The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing
Through Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of International Economics 61(2), 353–
383.
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Sayek, S.: 2004, FDI and Economic Growth: the Role
of Financial Markets, 64(1), 89–112.
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Volosovych, V.: 2005, Capital Flows in a Globalized
World: The Role of Policies and Institutions, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper (11696).
Barro, R. and Lee, J.: 2000, International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and
Implications, Center for International Development at Harvard University Working
Paper 49.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Levine, R.: 2000, A New Database on Financial Devel-
opment and Structure, World Bank Economic Review 14, 597–605.
Blonigen, B. and Wang, M. G.: 2005, Inapropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries
in Empirical FDI Studies, In Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?
eds. Moran, Graham, Blomstrom.
Busse, M. and Hefeker, C.: 2007, Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment,
European Journal of Political Economy 23(2), 397–415.
Coe, D. T. and Helpman, E.: 1995, International R&D Spillovers, European Economic
Review 39(5), 859–887.
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M.: 1983, Country Risk: Economic Aspects, New Haven, Conn,
Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
26
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M.: 1984, A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect
Capital Mobility, Economic Journal 94(373), 16–40.
Gordon, R. H. and Bovenberg, A. L.: 1996, Why is Capital so Immobile Internationally?
Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation, American Eco-
nomic Review 86(5), 1057–75.
Hausmann, R. and Fernandez-Arias, E.: 2000, Foreign Direct Investment: Good Choles-
terol?, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department (4203).
IMF: 1993, Balance of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition (BPM5), Washington, D.C.
Jensen, N. M.: 2005, Measuring Risk: Political Risk Insurance Premiums and Domestic
Political Institutions, EconWPA-0512002 .
Kobrin, S. J.: 1980, Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs, International
Organization 34, 65–88.
Kobrin, S. J.: 1984, Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends
from 1960 to 1979, International Studies Quarterly 28(3), 329–348.
Minor, M. S.: 1994, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy 1980-
1992, Journal of International Business Studies 25(1), 177–188.
OECD: 1996, Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment: Third Edition
(BD3), Paris.
Razin, A. and Sadka, E.: 2003, Gains from FDI Inflows with Incomplete Information,
Economics Letters 78(1), 71–77.
Thomas, J. and Worrall, T.: 1994, Foreign Direct Investment and Risk of Expropriation,
Review of Economic Studies 61(1), 81–108.
27
1 Appendix A
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Share of FDI 0.226 0.162 0.001 0.984 410
GERD 0.967 0.132 0.426 1.188 410
BERD 0.964 0.141 0.362 1.205 410
Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP 0.124 0.242 0 2.297 405
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 0.337 0.419 0 2.824 410
Liquid Liabilities / GDP 0.485 0.286 0.076 1.366 410
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP 0.395 0.305 0.058 1.66 410
GDP 8.026 0.767 5.684 9.818 410
Openness 4.204 0.599 2.584 5.433 405
Schooling 6.296 1.787 2.292 9.904 309
2 Appendix B
2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) : From Eqn. (21) we have the optimal FDI inflow to human capital ratio as:
kFBf
hFBf
=
(
w
1+ r
a
1−a
) 1
1−ε
, (26)
and the counterpart when the participation constraint binds:
k∗f
h∗f
=
(
w
1+ r+Default Premiumk f
a
1−a
) 1
1−ε
. (27)
Since the default premium is positive, we have (kFBf /h
FB
f )> (k
∗
f /h
∗
f ).
Part (ii) : Looking at the first order conditions for physical capital flows in the first best, Eqn.
(19) and Eqn (20), it is known that MPKFBf = MPK
FB
o = 1+ r. Also, from Eqn. (15) and Eqn.
(16), it is known that when the participation constraint binds (µ > 0), we have MPK∗f = 1+ r+
Default Premiumk f , and MPK
∗
o = 1+ r+Default Premiumko , where both of the default premiums
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are positive. These will imply that MPKFBf < MPK
∗
f and MPK
FB
o < MPK
∗
o . Since both of the
investment projects are strictly concave, k∗f < k
FB
f and k
∗
o < k
FB
o .
Both under first best and µ > 0, human capital gains its marginal product w. To see how the level of
human capital changes, I use the first order conditions in Eqn. (14) and (18), and see how human
capital reacts to changes in the k f to h f ratio,
h f =
α f ϕs sA(1−a)
w
[
(1−a)+a
(
k f
h f
)ε] α f−1ε(1−α f )
,
∂h f
∂
(
k f
h f
) = α f ϕs sA(1−a)
w
α f − ε
1−α
[
(1−a)+a
(
k f
h f
)ε] α f−1ε(1−α f )−1
a
(
k f
h f
)ε−1
> 0,
since α f > ε. It is also known that there has been an increase in the FDI to human capital ratio, i.e.
(kFBf /h
FB
f )> (k
∗
f /h
∗
f ), therefore it can be concluded that h
∗
f < h
FB
f .
2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The term that is common to both of the first order conditions in Eqn. (22) and Eqn. (23) is positive,
and can be denoted as χ= ϕs µs d1
s
(
Aa
α f
ε k
α f
f +k
αo
o
) . Then I have,
1+ r
MPK f
= 1−Ω∗χ, (28)
1+ r
MPKo
= 1−χ, (29)
where if Ω < 1, then 1+rMPK f >
1+r
MPKo
, which in turn implies MPK f < MPKo. Combining this infor-
mation with the first order conditions from Eqn. (15) and Eqn. (16), where:
MPK f = 1+ r+Default Premiumk f , (30)
MPKo = 1+ r+Default Premiumko , (31)
it can be concluded that Default Premiumk f < Default Premiumko .
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2.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i) : Using Eqn (22), and taking the derivative of Ω with respect to (h f /k f ):
Ω =
 1
1+ 1−aa
(
h f
k f
)ε

α f
ε −1
, (32)
∂Ω
∂
(
h f
k f
) = −(α f − ε)
 1
1+ 1−aa
(
h f
k f
)ε

α f
ε
1−a
a
(
h f
k f
)ε
< 0, (33)
as long as α f > ε.
Part (ii) : I want to show that the FDI share in total capital flows is greater when participation
constraint of the host country binds:
k∗f +h
∗
f
k∗f +h
∗
f + k∗o
>
kFBf +h
FB
f
kFBf +h
FB
f + kFBo
(34)
1
1+ k
∗
o
k∗f+h
∗
f
>
1
1+ k
FB
o
kFBf +h
FB
f
1+
k∗o
k∗f +h
∗
f
< 1+
kFBo
kFBf +h
FB
f
k∗o
k∗f
+
k∗o
h∗f
<
kFBo
kFBf
+
kFBo
hFBf
(35)
Let’s have a look at the first order conditions for the first best, where MPK f and MPKo are equal,
and α f = αo = α.
MPKFBo = MPK
FB
f (36)
s α
(
kFBo
)α−1 = s αA a((1−a) (hFBf
kFBf
)ε
+a
) α f
ε −1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘFB
(
kFBf
)α−1
ΘFB =
(
kFBo
kFBf
)α−1
(37)
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For the states when participation constraint binds, the default premium of FDI flows is less than the
default premium on non-FDI flows, hence:
MPKo > MPK f (38)
s α (k∗o)
α−1 > s αA a
(
(1−a)
(
h∗f
k∗f
)ε
+a
) α f
ε −1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ∗
(
k∗f
)α−1
Θ∗ <
(
k∗o
k∗f
)α−1
. (39)
It is known from Proposition 2 that (kFBf /h
FB
f ) > (k
∗
f /h
∗
f ), therefore I can combine Eqn. (37) and
Eqn. (39) as:
(
kFBo
kFBf
)α−1
= ΘFB < Θ∗ <
(
k∗o
k∗f
)α−1
(
kFBo
kFBf
)α−1
<
(
k∗o
k∗f
)α−1
kFBo
kFBf
>
k∗o
k∗f
. (40)
The last inequality can also be written as:
kFBo
k∗o
>
kFBf
k∗f
. (41)
We also know from Proposition 2 that (kFBf /k
∗
f )> (h
FB
f /h
∗
f ) and can write it as follows:
kFBf
k∗f
>
hFBf
h∗f
. (42)
Combining Equations (41) and (42) will give:
kFBo
k∗o
>
kFBf
k∗f
>
hFBf
h∗f
kFBo
k∗o
>
hFBf
h∗f
⇒ k
FB
o
hFBf
>
k∗o
h∗f
. (43)
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The equations (40) and (43) will together satisfy the condition in equation 35.
3 Appendix C
The data on Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D in million 2000 dollars, constant prices and
PPP adjusted (GERD) and Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D in million 2000 dollars –
constant prices and PPP adjusted (BERD) are from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.
Following Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2008), R&D capital stocks were calculated using the
perpetual inventory method:
rdt = (1−δ)rdt−1+RDEt−1,
where rd is the R&D capital stock, RDE is the R&D expenditure, and δ is the depreciation rate
which is assumed to be 0.05. The benchmarks are calculated as,
rd1982 = RDE1982/(δ+g),
where g is the annual average logarithmic growth rate of R&D from 1982-2004, i.e., g =
log(RDE2004/RDE1982) / 22.
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1 Introduction
Following Melitz (2003), a fast growing literature has been studying the consequences of
heterogeneous firms on the effects of trade and trade liberalization.1 Many of these stud-
ies have clear structural predictions about the relationship between trade liberalization and
firm-level trade-induced unemployment when firms differ in their total factor productivity.
Despite the interest in the role of heterogeneity, however, many of the theoretical implica-
tions and relationships of Melitz’s model have not yet been tested empirically. In this paper,
we make an attempt to narrow this gap by providing empirical evidence for the interaction
between firm productivity and trade liberalization in the determination of firm-level, trade-
induced unemployment.
Melitz (2003) develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to examine
the intra-industry effects of international trade. He finds that opening to trade causes the
least productive firms to stop producing and the more productive firms to start exporting, as
only the more productive firms can bear the fixed trade costs. As a result, market shares are
reallocated toward more productive firms, which leads to an aggregate productivity increase
and an increase in the zero-profit productivity cutoff, defined as the minimum productivity
level needed for a firm to produce domestically. Melitz also shows that trade liberalization
results in an increase in the zero-profit productivity cutoff and a decrease in the export
productivity cutoff, defined as the minimum productivity level needed for a domestic firm
to enjoy profitable exports.
Data limitations do not allow Melitz’s predictions to be tested directly. In particular, it
is practically impossible to partition firms’ profits between their domestically generated
portion and the part coming from exports. Our main contribution in this paper is that we
are able to quantify the relationship between firm productivity and firm layoffs caused by
trade. We do this by concentrating on the labor market and by employing reliable, novel
1See Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), Egger and Kreickemeier (2007), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004) among others.
data that allows us to directly identify firm-level, trade-induced unemployment. In addition,
we test and find support for important theoretical predictions regarding the direction and
magnitude of the changes in the zero-profit productivity cutoff and the export productivity
cutoff when a country pursues trade liberalization.
We stay close to the original Melitz framework and introduce tariffs to derive a structural
labor equation where the interactions between total factor firm productivity and trade lib-
eralization are the key determinants of the number of workers laid off due to trade. We
start by deriving firm-level employment in an autarky equilibrium. Then, we determine the
equilibrium number of workers in each firm when the country opens up to costly trade and
exercises protection. As a final step, we consider the case of trade liberalization, which is
the basis for our empirical analysis. The theoretical predictions of our structural model,
derived when a country liberalizes its trade policy, are unambiguous and suggest that, all
else equal: a) More productive firms will lay off fewer workers; b) The more a country
opens up to trade, the more layoffs there will be in the firms that produce only for the do-
mestic market; c) Firms in more protected industries will suffer fewer layoffs. The intuition
behind these findings is also clear: lower trade costs give a competitive edge to the more
productive firms that can afford to cover the export entry cost. These firms compete for
resources with the less productive domestically producing firms, which forces some of the
latter to exit the market and leads to an increase in the zero profit productivity cutoff. In
addition, all remaining firms that produce only for the domestic market suffer market share
and sales losses, which are accompanied by layoffs.
To test the predictions of our theoretical labor equation empirically, we use US firm-level
data for the period 1980-2005. We adopt the methodology from Olley and Pakes (1996) to
calculate total factor firm productivity, and we employ the Petition for Trade Adjustment
Assistance Dataset, maintained by the Employment and Training Administration of the
U.S. Department of Labor, to identify directly the number of workers laid-off due to trade
at the firm level. Overall, we find strong empirical support for the structural predictions of
our model as well as for some theoretical implications from other studies. We show that, as
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expected, firm productivity, trade liberalization, and the interactions between them are key
determinants of the magnitude of firm-level job destruction. More specifically, we find that
a one percent increase in a firm’s total factor productivity reduces the number of workers
who are laid-off due to trade liberalization by 32%, while, on average, an additional one
percent of trade liberalization increases the number of firm-level, trade-induced layoffs
by 2%. In addition, we provide empirical support for the following theoretical predictions
from Melitz (2003): a) Trade liberalization results in a higher zero-profit productivity cutoff
and a lower export productivity cutoff for domestic firms; b) The increase in the zero-profit
productivity cutoff for domestic production is larger than the absolute decrease in the export
productivity cutoff.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 3 presents the econometric model, data description, estimation, empirical
results, and sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Setting
Our theoretical model follows Melitz (2003). Given our empirical strategy, however, we
concentrate on the labor market and analyze the effects of trade and trade liberalization on
the equilibrium number of workers employed by each firm.
2.1 Autarky Equilibrium
Consumption. The representative consumer’s utility is derived from consumption of a
continuum of goods indexed by ω, and takes a CES functional form:
U =
[Z
ωεΩ
q(ω)ρdω
] 1
ρ
,
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where q(ω) is the amount of variety ω consumed, Ω is the mass of potentially avail-
able goods, and σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different va-
rieties. The consumer’s utility can be considered as an aggregate good, Q ≡ U , which
is composed of different goods varieties, with a corresponding aggregate price index P =[R
ωεΩ p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ . Making use of the definitions of aggregate consumption and the
CES price index, we solve the representative consumer’s problem to derive demand, q(ω),
and expenditure, r(ω), for each individual variety:
q(ω) = Q
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
, r(ω) = R
[
p(ω)
P
]1−σ
, (1)
where R = PQ =
R
ωεΩ r(ω)dω denotes aggregate expenditure.
Production. There is a continuum of firms, and each of them produces a different varietyω.
Production requires only labor and takes the following linear functional form: l = f +q/ϕ.
All firms pay the same fixed cost f , but have different productivity levels ϕ> 0.2 Given the
demand for individual varieties, each firm maximizes its profits by choosing the price of its
own variety, which can be expressed as a mark-up over marginal cost: p(ϕ) = 1ρϕ , where
the wage rate is normalized to one. This, in combination with the definition of expenditure
from (1), allows us to express firm revenues as:
r(ϕ) = R(Pρϕ)σ−1, (2)
which implies that the ratio of any two firms’ revenues will only depend on their produc-
tivities:
r(ϕi)
r(ϕ j)
=
(
ϕi
ϕ j
)σ−1
(3)
Furthermore, firm profits and labor demand can also be expressed as functions of produc-
2Thus, each variety ω can be uniquely mapped to a single productivity level ϕ.
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tivity:
pi(ϕ) =
r(ϕ)
σ
− f (4)
l(ϕ) = f +
σ−1
σ
r(ϕ). (5)
Entry. There is a large pool of potential entrants into any industry, and prior to entry all
the firms are identical. To be able to produce, firms must pay a fixed entry cost fe > 0,
which is sunk. After entry, firms draw their productivity ϕ from a distribution g(ϕ) with
a cumulative distribution G(ϕ). If a firm has a low productivity draw upon entry, it may
decide to exit immediately and not produce. Firms that decide to produce face an exogenous
probability of death δ in each period. Since the productivity level of a firm does not change
throughout its lifetime, its optimal per-period profit level remains constant. A firm that
enters the market with productivity level ϕ would then immediately exit if its per-period
profits were negative. This scenario implies a zero profit productivity cutoff condition
pi(ϕa) = 0 ⇐⇒ r(ϕa) =σ f , which determines the lowest productivity draw, ϕa, needed for
a firm to stay in the market: Any firm with productivity level ϕ< ϕa will immediately exit.
The productivity distribution of the firms that stay in the market will thus be µ(ϕ)= g(ϕ)1−G(ϕa) ,
where 1−G(ϕa) is the ex ante probability of successful entry. This defines the aggregate
productivity level ϕ˜ as a function of the cut-off level ϕa:
ϕ˜(ϕa) =
[
1
1−G(ϕa)
Z ∞
ϕa
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
(6)
As shown in Melitz (2003), ϕ˜ is also the average productivity level for the firms that choose
to produce and stay in the market. The combination of equations (4), (5), and the zero profit
productivity cutoff condition makes it possible to express average revenues as a function of
ϕa:
r(ϕ˜) =
[
ϕ˜(ϕa)
ϕa
]σ−1
σ f . (7)
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Free entry implies that new firms will enter the market as long as the average profit in the
industry is positive. Let M denote the equilibrium number of firms, which ensures that
economic profits are competed away.3 In equilibrium, aggregate variables such as the CES
price index P and aggregate expenditure R can be expressed in terms of the equilibrium
number of firms and the average productivity:
P = M
1
1−σ p(ϕ˜) = M
1
1−σ
1
ρϕ˜
(8)
R = Mr(ϕ˜) (9)
Equations (7), (8), and (9) allow us to express firm revenues in autarky, previously defined
by equation (2), as a function of the zero profit productivity cutoff:
r(ϕ) = σ fϕσ−1
(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
, (10)
which, in combination with equation (5), implies that the equilibrium number of workers
employed by firm with productivity ϕ in autarky will be:
la = f +(σ−1) fϕσ−1
(
1
ϕa
)σ−1
. (11)
Equation (11) implies that firms with higher productivity will employ more workers. The
intuition behind this result is that the more productive firms will enjoy larger market shares
and, therefore, will employ more workers in order to satisfy demand.
2.2 Equilibrium under Trade and Protectionism
In this section, we derive the equilibrium number of workers employed in each domestic
firm after the domestic economy is opened to trade. The world consists of n+1≥ 2 iden-
3See Melitz (2003) for the properties of the equilibrium and details on aggregation.
40
tical countries.4 Domestic firms can export their products to any country only after they
pay a fixed export cost, fx > 0, in addition to the fixed cost, f , which they must incur to
produce domestically. The decision to export is made after each firm draws its productivity
level. Regardless of their export status, all domestic firms still incur the same overhead
production cost. In addition, exporting firms face higher marginal cost of their exports
due to ad valorem tariffs, which are assumed to be symmetric across all trading partners.
Thus, each firm’s domestic pricing rule is given as before: pd(ϕ) = 1/ρϕ, while the export
price is: px(ϕ) = (1+ t)pd(ϕ) = (1+ t)/ρϕ, where subscript d stands for ‘domestic,’ and
subscript x stands for ‘export.’ This price rule separability, combined with the assumption
that each firm that exports must also engage in domestic production, implies separability
of exporting firms’ revenues:
r(ϕ) =
 rd(ϕ) if the firm does not exportrd(ϕ)+nrx(ϕ) = [1+(n(1+ t))1−σ]rd(ϕ) if the firm exports to all countries. (12)
In addition, this allows us to decompose each exporting firm’s profits into their domestic
and foreign portions, pi(ϕ) = pid(ϕ)+npix(ϕ), where:
pid(ϕ) =
rd(ϕ)
σ
− f , pix(ϕ) = rx(ϕ)σ − fx. (13)
Each exporting firm’s labor demand can also be decomposed into its domestic and export-
ing portions, lct(ϕ) = lctd (ϕ)+nl
ct
x (ϕ), where superscript ct denotes ’costly trade’ and:
lctd = f + rd(ϕ)
σ−1
σ
, lctx = fx+ rx(ϕ)
σ−1
σ
. (14)
As in the autarky equilibrium, there is a large pool of potential entrants and each firm
that enters the market with a productivity level ϕ would exit immediately if its domestic
4This implies that each country has n ≥ 1 potential trading partners, and all countries share the same
wages and same aggregate variables. In the empirical analysis we relax the assumption that the wages are
identical.
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profits were negative. In addition, however, some firms will also choose to export as long
as their productivity draw allows them to realize non-negative profits from exports. This
scenario implies two zero-profit productivity cutoff conditions: one for domestic profits,
pid(ϕct) = 0, which determines the lowest productivity draw, ϕct , needed for a firm to stay in
business; and one for export profits, pix(ϕctx ) = 0, which determines the lowest productivity
draw, ϕctx , needed for a firm to export.
The fact that each firm must incur additional fixed costs, fx, in order to export implies that
the lowest productivity draw, ϕctx , needed for profitable exports is necessarily higher than
the lowest productivity threshold, ϕct , needed for domestic production. It is also important
to establish the relationship between the zero-profit productivity cutoff in autarky and the
two zero-profit productivity cutoffs in the trade equilibrium. As shown in Figure 1, the
lowest productivity draw needed for domestic production must be higher once the country
opens up to trade.
-
-ϕ
a ϕct ϕctx
ϕ
Figure 1: Firm Productivity and Costly Trade
This result is driven by the fact that some domestic firms find it profitable to start export-
ing, which leads to an increase in their demand for resources. This forces some of the least
productive domestic firms out of the market and results in an increase in the average pro-
ductivity level at home, as well as to an increase in the zero-profit productivity cutoff for
domestic production.
Similar to the closed economy case, but this time using the average domestic productivity
level ϕ˜ and the average export productivity level ϕ˜x,5 we first express average revenues and
5Average export productivity is similar to its domestic counterpart, and is equal to ϕ˜(ϕctx ) =[
1
1−G(ϕctx )
R ∞
ϕctx ϕ
σ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
] 1
σ−1
.
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all aggregates in terms of the zero-profit productivity cutoffs, and then use them to solve for
the equilibrium number of workers employed in each firm depending on its export status.
The labor equation for the firms that only serve the domestic market is very similar to the
one describing the autarky equilibrium, the only difference being the zero domestic profit
productivity threshold, ϕct , which is higher in the trade equilibrium:
lct = f +(σ−1) fϕσ−1
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
. (15)
The equilibrium number of workers employed by an exporting firm is:
lct = f +n fx+(σ−1) fϕσ−1
(
1
ϕct
)σ−1
[1+n(1+ t)]1−σ. (16)
The intuition for the effects of introducing trade on equilibrium firm-level employment
described in equations (15) and (16) is clear. Once a country opens up to trade, the firms
that export gain market share due to the fact that they are now producing for other countries
as well. The increase in market share for the exporting firms is associated with more hires
and an increase in employment. On the other hand, some of the firms that produce only
for the domestic economy are forced out of the market while others incur losses associated
with layoffs. Given that the change in market share depends on the firm’s export status, and
hence on the productivity level of the firm, the number of laid-off workers and the number
of new hires will be contingent on firm productivity as well.
Taking the difference between the equilibrium number of workers employed in a domesti-
cally producing firm in the trade equilibrium, defined in equation (15), and the equilibrium
number of workers employed by the same firm in autarky, defined by equation (11), gives an
expression for the firm-level layoffs caused by trade. Similarly, the difference between the
equilibrium number of workers employed by an exporting firm, defined in equation (16),
and the equilibrium number of workers employed by the same firm in autarky, defined by
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equation (11), defines the number of hires due to trade.6
Ideally, one would like to be able to estimate both of the above relationships describing
firm-level job destruction and firm-level job creation caused by trade. Empirically this is
not possible for two reasons. First, in reality, we very rarely observe regime switching from
autarky to trade. What we observe most of the time is trade liberalization. Therefore, in the
next section, we derive and discuss the effects of trade liberalization on the labor market,
which we then quantify in our empirical analysis. Second, data availability allows us to
measure only firm-level layoffs caused by trade as opposed to both trade-induced layoffs
and trade-induced hires. To address this issue, we resort to the properties of our theoretical
setting. We employ the two zero profit cutoff conditions to express the zero-profit domestic
productivity cutoff ϕct in terms of the export productivity cutoff ϕctx and tariffs:
ϕct = ϕctx
1
(1+ tct)
(
f
fx
) 1
σ−1
. (17)
which allows us to derive a structural equation for the number of workers employed in a
domestically producing firm as a function of the zero profit export productivity cutoff and
ad valorem tariffs:7
lct = f +(σ−1) fxϕσ−1
(
1+ tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
. (18)
As will become clear in the next section, equation (18) allows us to quantify the relationship
6Technically, the exporting firms should also layoff some workers who are employed in production for the
domestic market. As shown in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), however, the net effect on employment
in the exporting firms will be job creation, while the net effect on employment in the firms that produce only
domestically will be job destruction.
7For simplicity and clarity of exposition, we only consider lay-offs in domestically producing firms. As
noted earlier however, equation (18) also describes employment of workers who are engaged in production
for the domestic market in exporting firms. Empirically, this is not a problem since we observe trade-induced
layoffs in all firms, regardless of their export status.
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between trade liberalization, firm productivity, and trade-induced lay-offs by concentrating
on the change in firm-level employment in domestically producing firms.
2.3 Trade Liberalization
In this section, we examine the impact of trade liberalization, in the form of a discrete
tariff reduction from tct to ttl , on productivity and employment levels for domestic firms.8
Qualitatively, the effects of trade liberalization are identical to the effects of opening up the
economy to trade, as described in the previous section. Figure 2 depicts the changes in the
zero-profit productivity cutoffs (both domestic and export) in response to trade liberaliza-
tion.
-
- - ﬀϕ
a ϕct ϕtl ϕtlx ϕ
ct
x
ϕ
Figure 2: Firm Productivity and Trade Liberalization
The export productivity cutoff decreases from ϕctx to ϕtlx because, due to lower export costs,
firms with lower productivity levels now find it profitable to export, which lowers the min-
imum productivity threshold required for exporting. Similarly, more foreign firms enter
the home market, which forces some of the least productive firms to exit and leads to an
increase in the minimum threshold needed for domestic production from ϕct to ϕtl .
As discussed earlier, the nature of available data forces us to concentrate on the labor de-
mand for the firms that produce only domestically. In the previous section, we derived a
structural equation (equation (16)) for the equilibrium number of workers employed by a
domestically producing firm as a function of tariffs. It is possible to show that the equilib-
8It should be noted that trade liberalization is symmetric, so that any decrease in domestic protection is
matched by an equivalent decrease in foreign protection, with symmetric effects on foreign firms.
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rium level of employment for domestic firms after trade liberalization is:
ltl = f +(σ−1) fxϕσ−1
(
1+ ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1
. (19)
The difference between the number of workers employed by each domestically producing
firm before trade liberalization (equation 18) and the number of workers employed by the
same firm after trade liberalization (equation 19) defines the number of firm-level layoffs
caused by trade liberalization:
lct− ltl = (σ−1) fx
(
1+ tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1− (σ−1) fx
(
1+ ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1
ϕσ−1 > 0. (20)
The assumption of trade liberalization, captured by a decrease in tariffs, implies that the
expression on right-hand side of equation (20) is strictly positive. Our final step is to make
equation (20) econometrically operational by setting the elasticity of substitution to be
equal to two, which implies:9
lct− ltl = fx
ϕctx
(1+ tct) ϕ− fx
ϕtlx
(1+ ttl) ϕ (21)
Equation (21) allows us to estimate the relation between firm-level trade-induced layoffs,
firm-level productivity, and trade liberalization through the coefficients in front of ϕ, ϕ(tct−
ttl) and ϕttl . Our expectations about the signs of these coefficients are clear. The expression
in brackets in the first term is negative, since the productivity cut-off level for exporting
increases with trade liberalization. This suggests that, all else equal, more productive firms
that only produce for the domestic market will lay off fewer workers. Trade liberalization
is associated with more layoffs for the firms that only produce domestically. Thus, we
9We experiment with alternative plausible values for the elasticity of substitution in Appendix A. Our
main empirical results do not change, and are available upon request. In addition, in our empirical analysis,
we also allow for the elasticity of substitution to vary across industries, which further reinforces our main
findings.
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expect the second coefficient to be positive. Finally, the negative sign of the third term
implies that, all else equal, firms operating in the more protected industries will suffer less
unemployment.
We finish this section by further formalizing the relationship between the zero-profit do-
mestic productivity cutoff and the export productivity cutoff in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With symmetric trade liberalization, the increase in the zero-profit domestic
productivity cutoff is smaller, in absolute value, than the decrease in the export productivity
cutoff: ∣∣∣ϕct−ϕtlϕct ∣∣∣< ϕctx −ϕtlxϕctx .
The more a country liberalizes its trade policy, the bigger the difference between the
changes in productivity cutoffs.
Proof. Apply the relationship in equation (17) to trade liberalization to show that:
∣∣∣ϕct−ϕtlϕct ∣∣∣= ϕ
ct
x −ϕtlx 1+t
ct
1+ttl
ϕctx
(22)
Trade liberalization, measured by reduction in tariffs, implies 1+tct1+ttl > 1, which means that
ϕtlx 1+t
ct
1+ttl > ϕ
tl
x and, therefore,
ϕctx −ϕtlx 1+t
ct
1+ttl
ϕctx
=
∣∣∣ϕct−ϕtlϕct ∣∣∣< ϕctx −ϕtlxϕctx .
Intuitionally, the lower magnitude if the increase in the zero-profit productivity cut-off
can be explained with the secondary nature of the effect on the firms that produce only
domestically. The direct effect of trade liberalization falls on the exporting side of the
market where more firms can afford to bear the sunk cost of exporting and, therefore, the
zero-profit export cut-off falls as a direct result of trade liberalization. The increase in the
zero-profit cut-off for the domestically producing firms is caused by the fact that resource
prices are bid up by the exporters and that forces some of the less productive firms to leave
the market.
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3 Empirical Analysis
We start this section by specifying the estimation equation and describing the data em-
ployed in our analysis. Next, we present and interpret our results to provide empirical
support for the theoretical predictions derived in the previous section. Sensitivity checks
confirm the robustness of our results.
3.1 Estimation Approach
To quantify the relationship between firm productivity, trade, trade liberalization, and firm-
level job destruction, we translate the structural labor equation for firm i operating in in-
dustry j, i ∈ j:
lcti − ltli = fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1
ϕtlx
]
ϕi+
fx
ϕctx
ϕi (tctj − ttlj )+ fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1
ϕtlx
]
ϕi ttlj , (23)
into the following estimation equation:
UNEMPLi = α0+α1T FPi+α2LIB j ∗T FPi+α3Tj ∗T FPi+ εi j, (24)
where UNEMPLi = ln(lcti − ltli ) is the logarithm of the number of workers who were laid
off from firm i due to import competition, T FPi = ϕi is the logarithm of total factor pro-
ductivity of firm i, Tj is the ad-valorem tariff faced by the international competitors of
import-competing firm i operating in industry j, LIB j is the difference between the lagged
and current ad-valorem tariffs in industry j, which is a proxy for the magnitude of liber-
alization, and α1 = fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1ϕtlx
]
, α2 = fxϕctx , and α3 = fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1ϕtlx
]
. Since fx and each of the
export productivity thresholds are positive, and the export productivity threshold decreases
with trade liberalization, we form the following expectations about the estimates of the
coefficients in equation (24): The coefficient in front of T FPi, α1, should be negative im-
plying an inverse relationship between total factor productivity and the number of workers
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laid-off by each import-competing firm due to trade. The estimate of α2 should be positive,
implying a positive relationship between the interaction of liberalization and productivity
(LIB j ∗T FPi): all else equal, the more open the country is, the more layoffs there will be
in the domestically producing firms. Finally, theory predicts a negative sign of the coef-
ficient on the interaction between tariffs and TFP, α3, which implies that, all else equal,
domestically producing firms in the more protected industries will lay off less workers.
The fact that we are investigating the effect of trade liberalization on unemployment only
for the firms that suffer from trade implies that our results are subject to selection bias due
to the fact that the firms in our sample are selected in a non-random manner. To address
this problem, we follow (Heckman 1979) and set up the following econometric model:
UNEMPLi = α0+α1T FPi+α2LIB j ∗T FPi+α3Tj ∗T FPi+ ε1i j (25)
and unemployment is observed if:
β0+β1EXCLi+βXij+ ε2i j > 0, (26)
where ε1i j and ε2i j are correlated and normally distributed. Equation (26) is our selection
equation based on whether a firm suffers from trade or not, (EXCLi) as our exclusionary
variable, and Xij is a set of control variables, which will be described below.
Because selection is heavily present in our model, finding a good exclusionary variable is
crucial for sound econometric results. Fortunately, a closer look at the Petition for Trade
Adjustment Assistance data, which we use to measure firm-level trade-induced unemploy-
ment, gave us an excellent opportunity to construct a good exclusion variable. In order to
receive TAA, US firms must go through a formal process of certification, where the gov-
ernment determines whether the firm is really affected by trade or it suffers for any other
reason. One would expect that if two firms produce identical products and one of them has
been TAA-certified, the other will also be eligible to enter the program. Surprisingly this
is not the case. There were cases in the data when even branches of the same company,
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producing identical products but operating in different states, had different outcomes when
applying for TAA. This made us think that overall political affiliation of a given state might
be a good indicator of what firm’s chances of getting TAA were. At the same time, whether
a state is “blue” or “red” should not be related to any firm’s performance and trade-induced
unemployment, in particular. Thus, we identified the political orientation of the state for
each firm in our sample based on the electoral results in 2000 and used it as an exclusionary
variable in our selection model.
3.2 Data Description
An advantage of our data is that it allows us to identify the trade-induced losses, in terms
of layoffs, at the firm level. We use the Petition for Trade Adjustment Assistance Database
(PTAA), a data set constructed and maintained by the Employment and Training Admin-
istration of the U.S. Department of Labor, to construct our trade-induced unemployment
variable. The PTAA data consists of firm-level data series at the 4-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) level including the date when a petition for TAA was filed, when
and whether the petition was certified, and the estimated number of workers to be laid off
by each firm as a consequence of increase in the quantity of imports for the industry. We
construct trade-induced unemployment by first dropping all firms whose petitions were not
certified for TAA, and then summing the total number of workers who were laid off due
to trade, and therefore TAA certified, for each firm and year. After that, to calculate labor
costs, we follow Keller and Yeaple (2007), and multiply the number of employees in each
firm (data item 29 in Compustat) by the average industry wage from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM) for the corresponding year.
To calculate total factor firm productivity, the main explanatory variable in our estimation,
we follow the procedure described in Keller and Yeaple (2007), who adopt the methodology
from Olley and Pakes (1996).10 The latter study emphasizes the simultaneity problem
10See Appendix A for details on the TFP calculation procedure.
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and selection bias for the calculation of productivity and allows for inter-industry TFP
comparisons. Once we calculate total factor productivity for each firm, we merge these data
with the certified firms from the TAA data set, which determines the size of the estimation
sample for our main analysis to be 1738 firm-level observations.
In addition to firm-level data on layoffs and productivity, we also employ various trade vari-
ables at the industry level, including imports, exports, and tariffs. We use tariff data to test
our theoretical predictions about trade liberalization. Even though non-tariff trade barriers
(NTBs) are probably a more significant and relevant measure of protection, we use tariffs
for two reasons. First, comprehensive data on NTBs for the period of investigation are not
available. Second, we believe that U.S. tariffs, which, for the period of interest in this pa-
per, are determined under the regulations and rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), are the more appropriate mea-
sure of protection in the current theoretical setting, which assumes symmetric trade costs
and symmetric trade liberalization. Therefore, we employ the change in tariffs to measure
trade liberalization.11 We use two sources for data on tariffs. Import-weighted average
tariffs for the period 1980-1988 are from Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and the tariffs
for the years after 1989 are from the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS).12
Data on sectoral imports and exports classified according to the four-digit SIC 1972-basis
are taken from two sources. Data on imports up to 1989 are from Feenstra (1996) and
data on exports up to 1990 are from Feenstra (1997). Trade flows for the years after 1990
(1989 for imports) are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and TRAINS.
11In order to keep our sample size as large as possible, we use tariffs at the three-digit SIC level to obtain
our main estimation results. In the sensitivity analysis, we also experiment with tariffs at the four-digit SIC
level and obtain very similar estimates.
12We accessed TRAINS through the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software at
http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/.
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3.3 Empirical Findings and Quantitative Implications
Results from the estimation of alternative specifications of equation (24) are presented in
Table 1. Column 1 of the table reports estimation results obtained from regressing trade-
induced, firm-level unemployment on firm-level total factor productivity only. As can be
seen from the table, there is a negative and significant relationship between TFP and trade-
induced firm-level layoffs. Or preliminary results suggest that a 1% increase in productivity
will lower trade-induced layoffs by about 14%.
Next, we estimate the full structural equation (24). Results, reported in column 2, are as
expected: the negative and significant coefficient on TFP indicates an inverse relationship
between total firm productivity and trade-induced firm level job destruction, which is in
accordance with theory. It should be noted that we cannot interpret the coefficient on TFP
directly as the effect of productivity on layoffs since TFP enters interactively in the other
terms in our model. We decompose and analyze the TFP effect below. We also establish
a positive and significant relationship between the degree of trade liberalization interacted
with TFP and trade-induced unemployment. As expected, the positive coefficient on LIB
implies that, all else equal, the more a country opens up to trade the more layoffs there
will be in import-competing industries and firms. Finally, we do not find support for the
prediction that, all else equal, more protected industries will lay off fewer workers. This
can be seen from the insignificant coefficient on T*TFP.
Our theoretical setting assumes that wages are equal across different firms. However, that
is not the case in reality. Therefore, we control for different wages by including labor costs
as a regressor in our empirical model. We calculate labor costs as the product of the number
of employees in each firm (from Compustat) and the average industry wage (from the An-
nual Survey of Manufactures) for the corresponding year. Column 3 of Table 1 reports our
results. Once again, we establish a negative and significant relationship between firm pro-
ductivity and trade-induced layoffs. The coefficient on the interaction between productivity
and trade liberalization is also significant and has the expected positive sign. Once again,
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Table 1: Firm Productivity and Trade Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP Model Labor Sigma Polit Selection
TFP -0.140 -0.147 -0.185 -0.183 -0.181 -0.352
(0.074)+ (0.070)* (0.094)* (0.075)* (0.081)* (0.094)**
LIB*TFP 1.781 1.924 1.968 1.903 1.230
(0.857)* (0.796)* (0.653)** (0.872)* (0.595)*
T*TFP 0.002 0.325 0.327 0.278 0.749
(0.517) (0.485) (0.608) (0.492) (0.500)
LABOR COST 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
SIGMA 0.046 0.049 0.160
(0.021)* (0.021)* (0.031)**
POLIT 0.167
(0.120)
Constant 4.688 4.682 4.578 4.329 4.253 5.525
(0.211)** (0.194)** (0.264)** (0.220)** (0.244)** (0.332)**
SELECTION
POLIT 0.099
(0.041)*
TFP 0.112
(0.042)**
CH NET TRADE -0.0002
(0.000)*
LABOR COST -0.000
(0.000)
SIGMA -0.066
(0.012)**
Constant 0.211
(0.146)
χ2 71.295
λ -2.120
(0.093)
TFP -.138 -.166 -.163 -.163 -.323
(.066 )* (.089) + (.069)* (.078 )* (.113)**
Observations 1150 1150 1150 1025 1025 1738
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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the relationship between current tariffs and layoffs due to trade is not significant. Finally,
as expected, labor costs have a positive and significant effect on firm layoffs, which should
not be surprising with downward-sloping labor demand: the more costly labor is, the more
workers are laid off.
Another simplification in our theoretical model is the assumption of a constant elasticity of
substitution across sectors and goods. While convenient, such a simplification means we
cannot investigate the relationship between an important source of industry variation, such
as the elasticity of substitution, and trade-induced layoffs. Therefore, our next step is to
control for the variation of σ across sectors by adding it as a covariate in our estimation
model. Data on industries’ elasticities of substitution comes from (Broda and Weinstein
2006). Column 4 of Table 1 presents our results, which are very similar to those ones
obtained after controlling for labor costs. As expected, the new variable, SIGMA, is sig-
nificant. The positive sign on the coefficient on the elasticity variable is also expected and
implies that, all else equal, firms in sectors with a higher elasticity of substitution will suffer
more layoffs.
Next, we estimate the selection model (25)-(26), which we consider to be our most com-
prehensive specification. In order to do so, we construct an exclusionary variable, POLIT,
which takes a value of one if a state is classified as Republican, based on the electoral votes
cast during a given presidential election year. First, we check whether our exclusionary
variable has any explanatory power in the structural equation 25. As can be seen from
column 5, we find no relation between the political affiliation of a state and the number of
workers laid off due to trade from a firm operating in this state. In addition, the signs, the
significance, and the magnitude of the other explanatory variables do not change. Overall,
these results suggest that POLIT might be a good exclusionary variable for our selection
model.
We employ maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the Heckman selection model (25)-
(26) to obtain our main estimates reported in the last column of Table 1.13 In addition to
13We also experiment with clustered standard errors to control for industry-year effects and with a jacknife
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our exclusionary variable POLIT, we use other covariates in the selection equation, which
we believe may affect TAA certification, including: firm productivity, change in net trade
(increase in exports minus increase in imports), labor cost, and elasticity of substitution. As
can be seen from the results presented in column 6, the coefficient on POLIT is significant,
which, in combination with a Wald test (χ21 = 71.295) reported at the bottom of column
6, validates our selection model. The positive sign of the coefficient on POLIT implies
that, all else equal, it is more likely to become TAA-certified in a Republican state.14 The
positive sign of TFP in our selection equation suggests that more productive firms are more
likely to receive TAA. The fact that the change in net trade has a negative effect on the
likelihood of qualifying for TAA should not be surprising since ‘increase in imports’ is one
of the key criteria used in the TAA certification process. Finally, we find that firms that
have higher elasticity of substitution are less likely to become TAA-certified. Estimation
results obtained for the structural equation after controlling for selection are qualitatively
similar to the results presented in column 2. The coefficient on TFP is negative and signifi-
cant; the coefficient on the interaction between trade liberalization and TFP is positive and
significant; and, the coefficient on T*TFP is still not significant. The main difference lies
in the magnitude on the TFP coefficient, which is now twice as large, and in the increase in
the significance of TFP. These results indicate an upward bias in the effect of productivity
on layoffs when we do not control for selection.
Our estimates allow us to quantify the net effect of productivity on trade-induced layoffs.
To do so, we use average tariffs and average lagged tariffs and calculate:
∂UNEMPL
∂T FP
= α1+α2LIB+α3T (27)
Employing the coefficients from column 6 of Table 1, which we believe are the most ap-
procedure to correct for outliers. In each case, our results, available upon request, are very similar to the main
estimates in Table 1.
14This, by itself, is a very interesting finding, which we investigate more thoroughly in a separate paper.
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propriate, we calculate the effect of productivity on trade-induced layoffs to be negative,
significant, and equal to -0.32 with a standard error 0.113. This means that, all else equal,
a one percent increase in the level of total factor firm productivity will lower the number
of workers who are laid off by each firm because of trade liberalization by 32 percent. As
can be seen from Table 1, other specifications give similar results for the negative relations
between TFP and trade-induced layoffs. Our estimates of these effects, presented at the
bottom of the table, range between 14 percent and 32 percent.
We are also able to quantify the effect of trade liberalization on trade-induced, firm-level
layoffs. Since our trade liberalization variable enters the estimation equation in levels,
while the layoffs are measured in logs, to calculate the elasticity of trade-induced layoffs
with respect to trade liberalization, we multiply the coefficient in front of the interaction
term LIB*TFP by the means of the TFP and LIB variables.15 We find that a one percent
increase in trade liberalization results in a significant increase of 2% with standard error of
0.009 in firm-level layoffs caused by trade.
The coefficients from column 6 do not allow us to recover directly the structural parameters
ϕctx and ϕtlx , which correspond to the productivity cutoffs for the exporting firms before and
after trade liberalization. However, under the assumption that our theoretical model is a
true representation of the data, we can draw some important inferences on the direction
and magnitude of the changes not only in the export productivity cutoffs, but also in the
domestic productivity cutoffs. The negative and significant coefficient on TFP implies that
the export productivity cutoff before trade liberalization is higher than the corresponding
cutoff after trade liberalization, which is exactly what theory predicts. To see this one
should examine at the theoretical expression of the TFP coefficient as α1 = fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1ϕtlx
]
. Our
estimate of α1 is below zero, which implies that ϕctx is greater than ϕtlx . Using the relation
between domestic productivity cutoffs, tariffs, and export productivity cutoffs described in
equation (22), we show that the zero-profit productivity cutoff before trade liberalization is
15In general, in a log-linear model, the regression equation is lnY = a+ bX + ε, and the slope coefficient
is dlnY/dX = (dY/dX)/Y . In order to calculate the elasticity, the coefficient is multiplied by X.
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lower than the zero-profit productivity cutoff after trade liberalization.
Employing the coefficients on TFP and LIB*TFP from equation (24), we calculate and
compare the percentage changes in the export and the domestic zero-profit productivity
cutoffs. First, we express the decrease in the export productivity cutoff, in terms of our
estimated coefficients, as:
ϕctx −ϕtlx
ϕctx
=
α1
α1−α2 . (28)
Applying the delta method we find the above relationship to be significant. We estimate
that trade liberalisation results in a 22% with a standard error of 0.092 decrease in the
export productivity threshold. In order to estimate the increase in the domestic zero-profit
productivity cut-off, we employ equation (28) in combination with equation (22), given the
average tariffs before and after trade liberalization. We find the increase in the domestic
zero-profit productivity cut-off to be significant and equal to 17% with a standard error of
0.076. The 5% difference between the changes in the export productivity and domestic
productivity cut-offs is significantly different from zero at any significance level, and is in
accordance with the theoretical prediction of Proposition 1.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We start our sensitivity analysis by introducing control variables which we believe are
important determinants of the magnitude of firm-level job destruction when a country lib-
eralizes its trade policy. Potential candidates are the level of imports and exports. The
intuition for controlling for imports is clear: the more an industry is exposed to foreign
competition, the more workers in this industry are likely to lose their jobs due to trade. We
include exports because we expect that, all else equal, fewer jobs will be lost in industries
with larger exports. OLS estimates are presented in column 1 of Table 2, while results in
column 2 of the table are from a Heckman selection model.
Both sets of results are very similar to our main results. We find a significant and nega-
tive impact of firm level productivity on layoffs. The coefficient on the interaction term
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LIB*TFP is positive and significant as expected. Once again, the coefficient on the other
interaction term T*TFP, is not significant and does not have the expected sign. In line with
our expectations and previous results, higher labor costs imply an increase in trade-induced
layoffs and an increase in the elasticity of substitution is positively associated with lay-
offs. The positive and significant coefficient on IMPORTS implies that, all else equal, an
increase in sectoral imports is associated with an increase in firm-level layoffs. Finally, the
inverse relation between an increase in exports and trade-induced layoffs is captured by the
negative and significant coefficient on EXPORTS.
Next, we turn to trade liberalization and tariffs. To obtain our main estimation results,
we employ tariffs at the three-digit SIC level. Here, we experiment with tariffs at the
four-digit SIC level. Arguably, four-digit SIC tariffs are a better measure of protection for
our purposes as we want to work with data at a disaggregation level which is as close as
possible to the firm level. We obtain two sets of estimation results: first using our main
selection model, (column 3 of Table 2), and then after controlling for exports and imports
in column 4. Once again, both sets of results are very similar to our previous findings:
The coefficients of TFP and LIB*TFP are significant and have the expected signs; but the
coefficient on T*TFP still does not have the expected negative sign and is not significant;
the coefficients on LABOR COST and SIGMA are positive and significant. Finally, there
is a positive and significant relation between IMPORTS and layoffs, and a negative and
significant relation between EXPORTS and layoffs.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to reconcile the vast amount of theoretical literature devoted
to studying the interactions between firm productivity, trade, and trade liberalization, and
the lack of empirical evidence for these relationships, especially when labor markets are in
question. The main contributions of our work are twofold: first, concentrating on the labor
market we use reliable data that enables us to measure firm-level unemployment caused
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by trade, and employ a selection model to quantify the relationships between productivity,
trade liberalization, and trade-induced layoffs. More specifically, we find that a one percent
increase in total factor firm productivity decreases trade-induced layoffs by 32%, while an
additional percent of trade liberalization increases the number of firm-level, trade-induced
layoffs by 2%. Second, we provide empirical evidence for key theoretical predictions from
previous studies regarding the direction and magnitude of the changes in the minimum
productivity thresholds required for domestic production as well as exports. In particular,
our results suggest that the zero-profit productivity cutoff for domestic firms will increase
while the export productivity cutoff will fall as consequences of trade liberalization. In
addition, we show that, in absolute terms, the change in the zero-profit productivity cutoff
for domestic production will be larger than the change in the export productivity cutoff.
An interesting extension of this paper will be to test whether and how our findings dif-
fer for industries with comparative advantage as opposed to industries with comparative
disadvantage. Bernard et al. (2007) extend Melitz’s (2003) model by allowing for firm
heterogeneity in a comparative advantage setting. They show that the zero-profit produc-
tivity cutoff increases in both types of industries but the increase is bigger in the sectors
with comparative advantage. In addition, the export productivity cutoff is closer to the
zero-profit productivity cutoff in sectors with comparative advantage. With regard to the
labor market, their findings suggest that trade liberalization results in simultaneous job
creation and job destruction in all industries, but the comparative disadvantage industries
exhibit net job destruction while comparative advantage industries experience net job cre-
ation. In accordance with their predictions, simple descriptive statistics of our data indicate
that trade-induced job destruction is observed in each industry in our sample, regardless of
whether the sector has a comparative advantage or not. After identifying the sectors with
and without comparative advantage, our data will allow for direct testing of whether the
effects of trade liberalization on the productivity cutoffs are contingent on the type of the
industry.
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Sel-Cont Cont SIC4 SIC4-Cont
TFP -0.159 -0.327 -0.340 -0.311
(0.077)* (0.098)** (0.085)** (0.106)**
LIB*TFP 2.262 1.498 1.068 1.267
(0.760)** (0.717)* (0.534)* (0.600)*
T*TFP 0.013 0.431 0.664 0.284
(0.548) (0.700) (0.447) (0.505)
LABOR COST 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
SIGMA 0.039 0.150 0.170 0.160
(0.020)* (0.042)** (0.023)** (0.041)**
IMPORTS 0.255 0.166 0.160
(0.042)** (0.051)** (0.052)**
EXPORTS -0.383 -0.260 -0.265
(0.090)** (0.094)** (0.093)**
Constant 4.248 5.460 5.498 5.457
(0.210)** (0.426)** (0.276)** (0.443)**
SELECTION
POLIT 0.084 0.103 0.091
(0.048)+ (0.041)* (0.045)*
TFP 0.111 0.103 0.101
(0.044)* (0.042)* (0.042)*
CH NET TRADE -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.000)+ (0.000)** (0.000)*
LABOR COST -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA -0.067 -0.070 -0.071
(0.015)** (0.011)** (0.013)**
Constant 0.234 0.214 0.237
(0.149) (0.148) (0.149)
χ2 49.833 63.650 44.961
λ -2.050 -2.113 -2.043
(0.098) (0.099) (0.105)
TFP -.147 -.307 -.315 -.297
(0.073)* (.091)** (0.082)** (0.099)**
Observations 1025 1738 1678 1678
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Appendix A: Alternative Specification of σ
To obtain our main estimation results, we work with the simplest form of our structural labor equa-
tion by setting the elasticity of substitution equal to two. Here, we formally expand the polynomial
defined in equation (18). Starting with the original equation (18),
lcti − ltli = (σ−1) fxϕσ−1i
[(
1+ tct
ϕctx
)σ−1
−
(
1+ ttl
ϕtlx
)σ−1]
, (29)
we can show that for reasonable values of σ, it takes the following forms:
lcti −ltli =

fx
[
1
ϕctx
− 1ϕtlx
]
ϕi+ fxϕctx ϕi t
ct − fxϕtlx ϕi t
tl, σ= 2
fx
[
1
(ϕctx )2
− 1(ϕtlx )2
]
ϕ2i +
fx
(ϕctx )2
ϕ2i tct +
fx
(ϕctx )2
ϕ2i (tct)2
− fx(ϕtlx )2 ϕ
2
i t
tl− fx(ϕtlx )2 ϕ
2
i (t
tl)2, σ= 3
fx
[
1
(ϕctx )3
− 1(ϕtlx )3
]
ϕ3i +
fx
(ϕctx )3
ϕ3i tct +
fx
(ϕctx )3
ϕ3i (tct)2+
fx
(ϕctx )3
ϕ3i (tct)3
− fx(ϕtlx )3 ϕ
3
i t
tl− fx(ϕtlx )3 ϕ
3
i (t
tl)2− fx(ϕtlx )3 ϕ
3
i (t
tl)3, σ= 4
. . . σ ∈ {5,6,7}
We estimate the above equations, derived for different values of σ, to find that the new estimates
(available upon request), are very similar to the main results reported in Table 1 and the sensitivity
analysis presented in Table 2.
Appendix B: TFP Calculation Procedure
Consider the following production function that assumes Cobb Douglas technology:
yit = β0+βllit +βmmit +βkkit +uit , (30)
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where yit is the logarithm of the firm i’s output at time t, while lit , mit and kit represent the firm i’s
(logarithm of) labor, materials and capital inputs respectively. Let the error term uit be composed of
two parts,
uit = ωit +ηit , (31)
The simultaneity problem here is that a part of the productivity, ωit , will be observed by the firm
and will affect its decision of the factor inputs such as labor or materials. Hence, the error term and
the regressors will be correlated and OLS estimation will give biased results.
Selection bias arises because some of the firms stop producing and exit the market in a non-random
manner. This could be the case when firms with higher levels of capital are less likely to exit the
market if they receive a low realization of ωit . Given that small firms might exit at productivity
draws for which large firms would keep operating, the correlation between ωit and kit is negative.
Failing to control for this self-selection will cause a negative bias in the capital coefficient. However,
given our data set, we do not have firms that exit the market during the time period analyzed and
hence we do not correct for this bias.
Following previous empirical work, we assume that labor and materials are variable inputs, so they
are contemporaneously correlated with ωit . However, capital kit is determined by past values of ω,
not the current one. Investment is then a strictly increasing function of ωit and kit , and provided that
iit > 0, it can be inverted to get an expression for the productivity ωit :
ωit = hit(iit ,kit) (32)
Substituting (32) into (30) will give us:
yit = βllit +βmmit +φit(iit ,kit)+ηit , (33)
where φit(iit ,kit) = β0+βkkit +hit(iit ,kit), and can be estimated by a fourth order polynomial in kit
and iit . In the first step, we estimate the equation (33) and get consistent estimates for βl and βm.
Then, in order to identify βk, we assume ωit is a random walk i.e., ξit = ωit−ωit−1 and estimate the
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following equation:
yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit = βkkit +g(φˆit−1−βkkit−1)+ξit +ηit , (34)
where φˆit−1 is estimated from (33), φˆit−1−βkkit−1 is an estimate of ωit−1 and the unknown function
g(.) is a fourth order polynomial in φˆit−1−βkkit−1 and Pˆit . After estimating equation (33), we esti-
mate log total factor productivity as:
t f pit = yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit − βˆkkit (35)
Data on firm level output, labor, materials and capital, needed to calculate firm productivity, are
taken from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Industrial Database. Output is measured as the value of
nominal net sales (data item 12 in Compustat), which we deflate by using value added price defla-
tors from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) at the two-digit NAICS. The nominal value of
expenditures on materials is calculated by subtracting capital depreciation and amortization (data
item 14 in Compustat) and labor costs from the total cost of goods sold (data item 41) and selling,
general, and administrative expenses (data item 189 in Compustat). We deflate the nominal mate-
rial costs by the two-digit NAICS industry material price deflators from the BEA and Bartelsman,
Becker, and Gray (2001). Labor costs are calculated as the product of the number of employees in
each firm (data item 29 in Compustat) and the average industry wage, from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM) for the corresponding year. Capital (data item 8 in Compustat) is defined as
the value of property, plant and equipment net of depreciation. To deflate this variable we use the
two-digit NAICS industry investment price deflators from the BEA and Bartelsman, Becker, and
Gray (2001). Finally, we use the same deflators to adjust the nominal value of investment from
Compustat.
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1 Introduction
Several studies suggest that audited financial statements influence the terms and structure
of syndicated loans. However, there is little or no research examining the influence of po-
tential financial statement errors.1,2 Previous research suggests that in the syndicated loan
market, a greater likelihood of potential accounting errors increases asymmetric informa-
tion problems and increases borrowers’ credit risk (Graham, Li and Qiu 2007). In addition,
Dye (1993) and Simunic (1980) suggest that total equilibrium auditing fees may be related
to the likelihood of potential accounting errors.3 In this paper, we examine whether an
increase in equilibrium audit fees as the result of an increase in the demand for auditing
services is related to credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated
loan market. We suggest that an increase in demand for auditing services should be asso-
ciated with a greater quantity (hours billed) and/or price (hourly fee) of auditing services
purchased in equilibrium, resulting in greater total audit fees.4 We speculate that the extent
of borrowers’ credit risk and asymmetric information problems is decreasing in the quan-
tity of auditing services purchased.5 We use data on auditing fees and syndicated loans to
provide evidence that an increase in auditing fees, due to an increase in the demand for
1A syndicated loan is a loan where two or more lenders provide a loan to a borrower. Typically, a lead
lender negotiates the terms of a loan contract directly with a borrower for an agreed-upon range of interest
rates. The lead lender then uses the negotiated terms of the loan contract to solicit participant lenders to
provide a portion of the loan’s funding. Usually, a lead lender provides funding for the residual portion of
the loan that remains after soliciting financing from participants. Lead lenders typically transfer as much
ownership of loans to participants as possible.
2Recent research describing how audited financial statements potentially reduce asymmetric information
problems in the syndicated loan market include Simons (1993), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), Dennis and
Mullineaux (2000), Jones, Lang and Nigro (2000), Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Panyagometh and Roberts
(2002), Esty and Megginson (2003), and Sufi (2007).
3For the remainder of the paper we refer to audit fees as the price multiplied by the quantity of auditing
services. When needed, we refer to the price and quantity of auditing services separately. Consistent with
Bell, Landsman and Shackelford (2001), we interpret the unit of audit quantity as hours of auditing services,
and the price of auditing services as the fee per hour of auditing services.
4We define the quantity of auditing services as the number of hours billed by auditors and price of auditing
services as the hourly fee charged by auditors.
5Auditors reduce credit risk and asymmetric information problems by providing a certain level of assur-
ance that financial records are free from a material error. We suggest that the level of assurance auditors
provide is an increasing function of the number of auditing hours billed.
auditing services, is negatively associated with the interest rates and the maturity length
of syndicated loans.6 In addition, we find that total audit fees are positively associated
with the number of lenders in syndicated loans; however, we are unable to discern whether
this result is due to movements in the supply or demand curves for auditing services. We
identify an increase in the demand for auditing services through an instrumental variable
procedure with instruments that are expected to shift the demand curve for auditing services
rather than the supply curve for auditing services. We argue that our results are consistent
with the argument that an increase in the demand for auditing services is associated with a
decline in credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market
due to a decrease in the likelihood of potential accounting errors.
In the syndicated loan market, potential accounting errors exacerbate credit risk and asym-
metric information problems. A greater likelihood of potential accounting errors reduces
borrowers’ expected future profitability thereby increasing borrowers’ credit risk.7 In ad-
dition, since borrowers are likely to have better information regarding their own character-
istics compared to what would even be presented in the most accurate financial statements,
potential accounting errors increase asymmetric information problems between borrowers
and lenders. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates that all publicly traded firms
6While it may seem controversial that firms with greater credit quality and fewer asymmetric information
problems would borrow at shorter maturities, several empirical papers find similar results with similar data
sets. For example, Strahan (1999) finds that borrowers with speculative grade debt ratings borrow at higher
interest rates and longer maturities in the syndicated loan market. Moreover, Graham, Li and Qiu (2007)
examines the impact of realized accounting errors and finds firms with realized accounting errors borrow
at shorter maturities because they are of intermediate to high risk. As we more fully articulate later on,
we predict that the majority of our borrowers in our data sample are of moderate to high credit quality,
which we will assert allows us to predict maturity is negatively associated with credit quality and asymmetric
information problems. In addition, Graham, Li and Qiu (2007) mentions the same point we make later on,
that maturity is a non-monotonic function of credit quality. We mention this all early on, to be proactive in
justifying this possibly counterintuitive prediction to readers.
7Graham, Li and Qiu (2007) suggests that when accounting errors are realized, firms’ expected future
profitability can decline for three reasons: (1) usually revealing accounting errors unveils unfavorable infor-
mation regarding firms’ expected future profitability; (2) firms typically have to pay damages to investors
that have been misled by accounting errors; (3) the terms of trade firms face usually change unfavorably after
the revelation of an accounting error. For example, customers of a manufacturing firm may believe that the
firm may be more likely to declare bankruptcy in the future after an accounting error and customers may be
less likely to purchase goods with warranties thinking that the firm will not remain in business to service the
warranty.
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have their financial statements audited by an independent external auditor. These manda-
tory audits potentially reduce firms’ credit risk and asymmetric information problems by
verifying that financial statements are accurate, in the sense that the statements adhere to
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and that users can be reasonably assured
that financial statements are free from a material error.8
While all publicly traded firms are required to have their financial statements audited, firms
have discretion to determine the quantity of auditing services purchased. In other words,
firms are free to determine their individual demand for auditing services beyond a minimum
quantity. Firms may demand a greater quantity of auditing services beyond the minimum
amount to further decrease the likelihood of an accounting error, which should increase the
accuracy of their financial statements.9 Hence, an increase in equilibrium auditing fees due
to a shift in the demand curve for auditing services should be associated with a decline in
firms’ credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market.10
Likewise, as firms are free to choose their own demand for auditing services, auditing firms
individually choose their own supply functions for auditing services, which are determined
by the costs of providing an audit. The costs of supplying auditing services include both
the costs of physically performing audits and the expected future legal liabilities associated
with audits. Auditing firms typically face legal liability from audits when a material ac-
counting error that misleads investors is revealed, and auditors fail to detect the accounting
error due to negligence in providing audits.11 Since expected legal liabilities are derived
from the expected likelihood of an accounting error or not detecting an accounting error,
8A material error is an error that would change a decision made by a user of the financial statements.
9For example, when verifying the value of a firm’s assets, auditors may value a sample percentage of
assets, rather all of the assets; however, firms can request that auditors sample a larger percentage of assets to
increase confidence in the valuation of assets stated in their public financial statements.
10As will be explained later, if the supply curve is upward sloping, an increase in the demand for auditing
services would imply an increase in the equilibrium quantity of auditing services purchased. The increase in
the quantity of auditing services purchased is what reduces credit risk and asymmetric information problems.
11Auditing firms should be held liable whenever there is a misleading accounting error that was left unde-
tected because of negligently provided audits. Practically, errors are commonly found when borrowers are in
financial distress. In addition, auditors are often found liable when auditing clients are in financial distress
even when audits were not negligently provided.
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an increase in auditing fees due to a shift in the supply curve should be associated with an
increase in credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan mar-
ket. In addition, a shift in the supply curve could also result in a greater likelihood of an
accounting error if the equilibrium quantity of auditing services declines.12
In this paper, we examine whether an increase in equilibrium auditing fees paid by firms
due to an increase in the demand for auditing services is related to credit risk and asym-
metric information problems in the syndicated loan market. We base our examination, in
part, on the theory that if an increase in auditing fees is due to an increase in the demand
curve for auditing services, then an increase in audit fees is associated with a decrease
in credit risk and asymmetric information problems. Our examination is also based on
the previous theoretical and empirical literature discussing the impact of credit risk and
asymmetric information on debt contract terms, which predicts that borrowers with greater
credit risk and asymmetric information problems receive loans: (1) with higher interest
rates (Diamond 1984); (2) that are more difficult to sell (Leland and Pyle 1977, Diamond
1984, Holmstrom and Tirole 1997, Sufi 2007, Ivashina 2008); (3) with shorter maturities
(Flannery 1986, Diamond 1991). Combining data on audit fees from the Audit Analytics
database and data on the price and non-price terms of syndicated loan contracts from the
DealScan database, we test the hypothesis that if an increase in auditing fees is associated
with an decrease in credit risk and asymmetric information, then: (1) the interest spread
on a syndicated loan should be negatively associated with auditing fees; (2) the number
of lenders in a syndicate should be positively associated with auditing fees; and (3) the
maturity length of a syndicated loan should be negatively associated with auditing fees.
There are numerous complications associated with empirically testing our hypothesis. The
primary complication is that equilibrium auditing fees are determined by the interaction of
the supply and demand curves for auditing services. Hence, an increase in auditing fees
12Two mechanisms are at work here: (1) a decrease in supply is associated directly with expected legal
liabilities, which should be associated with greater credit risk; (2) a decrease in the supply of auditing services
is directly associated with a decrease in the equilibrium quantity of auditing services purchased assuming a
downward-sloping demand curve for auditing services.
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may be associated with either an increase or decrease in the price and/or quantity of audit-
ing services purchased.13 In addition auditing fees may be endogenous to syndicated loan
contract terms, correlated with unobserved and omitted control variables, and our proxy for
auditing fees may be measured with error. In order to overcome these complications, we
undertake our analysis with a generalized method of moments (GMM) instrumental vari-
ables estimator. We use instruments for the size of firms’ inventory, accounts receivable,
number of operating segments, and dispersion of economic activity among operating seg-
ments as instruments for auditing fees. We choose these instruments first of all because: (1)
they are likely to be primary determinants of the demand for auditing fees; (2) they are not
endogenous to loan contract terms; (3) they are uncorrelated with relevant unobservable
or unintentionally omitted variables; (4) they are uncorrelated with measurement error in
auditing fees; and (5) we perceive no strong theoretical argument as to why these variables
should instead be used as explanatory variables for loan terms.
Our results indicate that audit fees are associated with syndicated loans with lower inter-
est rates, shorter maturity lengths, and a greater number of lenders. However, our results
are consistent with the assertion that demand-induced increases in audit fees influence the
interest rate and maturity length of syndicated loans. Our results do not allow us to dis-
cern whether increases in the demand for auditing services influence the number of lenders.
Overall, we interpret our results as supporting the proposition that an increase in equilib-
rium auditing fees, due to a shift in the demand curve for auditing services, is associated
with a decrease in credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan
market.14,15
13As we discuss later, we assume the quantity of auditing services is the number of hours billed, and the
price of auditing services is the hourly fee as in Bell, Landsman and Shackelford (2001).
14While investment in inventories could be determined, in part, by the cost of syndicated loan financing or
other loan contract terms, our instrumental variables are lagged one period, which reduces the likelihood that
the instrumental variables are endogenous to loan features.
15We argue that our instrumental variables do not belong in the regression because any information these
variables contain for credit risk is likely spanned by the other control variables and there are no definitive pre-
dictions regarding these variables and credit risk. For example, while inventories could reflect the existence
of more collateral available in the event of default, an increase in inventories could also reflect an unexpected
decline in sales.
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Our results are important for several reasons. First, the only study examining the implica-
tions of accounting errors or financial statement accuracy for debt contracting is Graham,
Li and Qiu (2007). However, these authors examine the implications of realized accounting
errors for debt contracting. In contrast, our study examines the impact of potential account-
ing errors for debt contracting. These authors suggest that accounting errors increase credit
risk as perceived by lenders because lenders usually lower expectations about borrowers’
profitability following accounting errors, and accounting errors increase asymmetric infor-
mation problems because financial statement data is less reliable, which widens the infor-
mation gap between borrowers and lenders. Moreover, our study is the first examining the
empirical implications of audit fees for debt contracting.
The second reason our results are important is because the syndicated loan market is a
primary source of financing for large publicly traded corporations, and our results provide
additional insights regarding the impact of credit risk and asymmetric information in this
market.
The third reason our results are important is that our results suggest auditing services miti-
gate asymmetric information problems with outside investors as intended by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Several observers have raised concerns that greater audit fees are
no more than auditees paying to get away with accounting malfeasance, but our results
suggest that lenders in the syndicated loan market associate a greater quantity of auditing
services purchased with a decline in credit risk and asymmetric information problems.
Our results contribute to several literatures. First, our results contribute to the literature
regarding the determinants of auditing fees. An implication of the theory by Simunic (1980)
is that expected litigation costs are a primary determinant of auditing fees. Dye (1993)
provides a model where the supply for auditing fees depends on expected litigation costs
resulting from accounting errors, and the demand for auditing services depends on the
benefits of more accurate financial statements. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002)
presents empirical evidence that audit fees are greater for better corporate boards, which
implies the demand for more accurate accounting records is a determinant of auditing fees.
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We find that an increase in the demand for auditing services, which raises equilibrium audit
fees and the quantity of audit services purchased, is consistent with a reduction in credit
risk and asymmetric information in the syndicated loan market. We interpret this result as
suggesting that an increase in the quantity of auditing services purchased is associated with
a reduced likelihood of financial statement errors.
Our results contribute to the literature regarding audit fee determination by providing addi-
tional evidence that an increase in equilibrium audit fees, as a consequence of an increase
in the demand for auditing services, is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a
financial statement error. Moreover, our results contribute to this literature by providing
an econometric approach that attempts to separate the influence of the demand for auditing
services on audit fees from the impact of the supply for auditing services.
Our results contribute to the literature regarding the influence of asymmetric information
problems for the terms of syndicated loan contracts. Diamond (1984) presents a model
where the cost of bank loan financing is increasing in the amount of resources lenders allo-
cate to monitoring borrowers to overcome asymmetric information problems. Our results
are consistent with the assertion that audit fees reduce asymmetric information, thereby
reducing the amount of resources lenders must allocate to overcoming asymmetric infor-
mation problems, therefore reducing borrowing costs.
Additionally, our results contribute to the literature regarding the incentives to produce
information. Several studies provide theoretical justifications regarding barriers to infor-
mation production about firms’ creditworthiness. Hirshleifer (1971) suggests that agents
producing information may have a hard time credibly convincing other users that they have
produced valuable information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that it may not be
economically rational to produce information if the producer cannot be certain that their
information cannot be resold or transferred without their approval, thereby diminishing the
returns to information production. Our results are consistent with the rationale that firms
find it beneficial to pay for the production of information that can be used by anyone at zero
cost, and that lenders in the syndicated loan market find this information credible.
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2 Theoretical Background
In the syndicated loan market, audited financial statements play a crucial role by influencing
the extent of borrowers’ credit risk and asymmetric information problems.16 In a typical
syndicated loan, a lead bank negotiates the non-price terms of a loan contract (loan amount,
maturity length, collateral, covenants, performance pricing) with a borrower for an agreed-
upon range of interest rates. Subsequently, the lead bank uses the negotiated loan contract
terms to solicit a group of participant lenders willing to provide a portion of the loan’s
funding. Asymmetric information problems arise when borrowers have private information
regarding their creditworthiness that they may use to the detriment of lenders’ profitability.
Borrowers’ financial statements provide a noisy signal regarding borrowers’ characteristics,
reducing uncertainty regarding borrowers’ creditworthiness, which mitigates asymmetric
information problems.
Previous research examining the determinants of audit fees suggests that total equilibrium
audit fees, which are defined as the price multiplied by the quantity of auditing services,
may be either negatively or positively associated with the likelihood of an accounting error
(Simunic 1980, Dye 1993), because an increase in auditing fees could be associated with
either an increase or decrease in the quantity of auditing services purchased. Typically
the quantity of auditing services is defined as hours worked by auditors and the price of
auditing services is the hourly fee charged by auditors (Bell, Landsman and Shackelford
2001). These studies predict that an increase in the demand for auditing services should be
associated with an increase in the equilibrium price of auditing services, and an increase
in the equilibrium quantity of auditing services purchased. Any increase in the equilibrium
quantity of auditing services should be associated with a decline in the likelihood of an
accounting error.
Typically, auditors verify accounting records by sampling a percentage of a unit of account.
16See (Simons 1993, Preece and Mullineaux 1996, Dennis and Mullineaux 2000, Jones, Lang, Nigro and
Riley 2001, Lee and Mullineaux 2004, Panyagometh and Roberts 2002, Esty and Megginson 2003, Sufi
2007).
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For example, when verifying the value of inventories or accounts receivables, auditors may
not verify the value of each unit of inventory or every receivable but will instead verify
the value of a percentage of inventories and receivables. Auditors may be able to verify
a certain percentage of an account in a given number of hours, which provides a certain
level of assurance that there are no accounting errors. Hence, if auditors sample a greater
percentage of accounts, there should be an increase in the number of hours billed, and
greater assurance that there are no errors in the valuation of these accounts.
The demand for auditing services depends on the benefits of more accurate financial state-
ments, which include a decline in expected losses due to accounting errors and a reduction
in asymmetric information problems between firms and outsiders (Graham et al. 2007).
When accounting errors are realized, firms may be held liable and forced to pay dam-
ages to plaintiffs, which reduces their profitability. Profit expectations are also reduced
because accounting errors, more often than not, conceal unfavorable information regarding
borrowers’ future profitability. In addition, profitability also declines because firms often
receive less favorable terms of trade in transactions following accounting errors, due to rep-
utation damage caused by accounting errors. Potential accounting errors may exacerbate
asymmetric information problems if borrowers have more knowledge regarding the correct
information than lenders, and borrowers use this information advantage to the detriment of
lenders’ profitability.17 Hence, an increase in equilibrium auditing fees due to an increase
in the demand for auditing services should result in a decline in the likelihood that financial
statement errors will be realized in the future, thereby reducing credit risk, and decreasing
asymmetric information problems.
These models assert that the supply of auditing services is determined by the costs of phys-
ically providing an audit and the expected litigation costs associated with providing an au-
dit. In terms of legal liability, auditors can be held individually liable if plaintiffs can prove
17For example, borrowers may fraudulently misrepresent financial statement data in order to inflate finan-
cial markets’ expectations of their future earnings, thereby distorting financial markets’ perception of their
credit risk. Hence, financial markets realize that financial statements may not reflect borrowers’ true risk
characteristics, exacerbating asymmetric information problems.
75
that auditors did not provide audits consistent with generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS), and may suffer joint liability with audited firms’ management if account records
fail to adhere to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Dye 1993). Audits are
generally considered to not comply with GAAS when audits do not adequately search for a
material accounting error that misleads investors, and accounting records are considered to
not comply with GAAP when there are material accounting errors that mislead investors.
Since expected legal liabilities are derived from the likelihood of an accounting error, an
increase in auditing fees as a result of a decrease in supply should be associated with an
increase in credit risk and asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market.
In addition, if a decrease in the supply for auditing services also lowers the quantity of au-
diting services purchased, this should also increase the likelihood of a potential accounting
error.18
Given that potential accounting errors present an asymmetric information problem and ad-
ditional credit risk, and that an increase in the demand for auditing fees should be related
to a decrease in the likelihood of potential accounting errors, we can develop several em-
pirical predictions regarding the association between audit fees and the terms of syndicated
loan contracts, based on the literature discussing the impact of credit risk and asymmetric
information on debt contracting.
The literature on loan contracting predicts that greater asymmetric information and credit
risk is associated with higher loan interest rates. In the theories of Diamond (1991) and
Boyd and Prescott (1986), lenders must exert more effort monitoring borrowers suffering
from more severe asymmetric information problems, which raises the cost of loan financ-
ing. In addition, standard economic theory suggests that if a borrower’s expected future
profitability declines due to an accounting error, lenders will charge higher interest rates as
compensation for greater default risk.
Several studies suggest that greater asymmetric information and credit risk should be as-
18Audit fees could also increase due to an increase in the supply of auditing services if the price elasticity
of demand is greater than one. While possible, we view this as a less likely scenario.
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sociated with smaller lending syndicates. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) present a model
where lenders form smaller lending syndicates when default risk is greater in order to re-
duce bankruptcy costs, because it is easier to negotiate a resolution with fewer lenders. In
addition, models by Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), and Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997) imply that lenders originating loans will retain a greater ownership stake in a loan to
signal the quality of the loan and commit to monitoring the borrower. Sufi (2007) provides
empirical evidence that lead lenders in syndicates retain greater ownership stakes in syndi-
cated loans, form smaller syndicates, and form more concentrated syndicates for borrowers
suffering from more severe asymmetric information problems, particularly moral hazard
problems. Ivashina (2008) presents evidence that lead lenders retain greater ownership
stakes in loans in order to reduce asymmetric information problems.19
Two different studies provide empirical predictions regarding the impact of default risk
and asymmetric information for the maturity of debt financing. Flannery (1986) presents
a model with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders where more cred-
itworthy borrowers will issue short-term debt, when issuing debt requires the payment of
transaction costs. They do so because paying repeated transaction costs to issue short-term
debt, rather than issuing long-term debt, signals to credit markets that borrowers are more
creditworthy. We suggest that greater auditing fees could be a transaction cost that firms
face when issuing debt. Diamond (1991) presents a model where borrowers with both low
and high credit quality will issue short-term debt and borrowers with moderate credit risk
will issue long-term debt. Because our study focuses on borrowers with high or moderate
levels of credit quality, we predict that borrowers with greater credit quality should borrow
at shorter maturities.
Based upon the preceding discussion, we have three empirically testable predictions. If an
increase in equilibrium audit fees due to an increase in the demand for auditing services is
19When we refer to asymmetric information problems in the syndicated loan market, we refer to two
separate problems: those between lenders and borrowers, and those between lead lenders and participant
lenders. We suggest that potential accounting errors influence these asymmetric information problems in the
same manner.
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associated with a decrease (increase) in credit risk and asymmetric information, then:
• audit fees are negatively (positively) associated with loan interest rates,
• audit fees are positively (negatively) associated with the number of lenders in a syn-
dicated loan, and
• audit fees are negatively (positively) associated with the maturity of a syndicated
loan.
3 Empirical Model and Sample Selection
We begin constructing our data sample with the Audit Analytics database, a database con-
taining detailed audit information for more than 15,000 corporations filing public financial
statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). From this database, we
gather data on firms’ audit fees and non-audit fees. Audit fees include the cost of per-
forming the audit, while non-audit fees include compensation for other ancillary services
provided by auditors, such as tax preparation services.20 We then merge the Audit Analyt-
ics database with the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, a database containing
information regarding the price and non-price loan contract terms for loans to large corpo-
rations.21 We combine observations from the merged Audit Analytics-DealScan database
with accompanying financial statement data from Compustat and stock price data from the
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. The unit of observation in our
database is a loan facility obtained by a firm in a given fiscal year. The sample, with all loan
facilities included, contains observations on 4,668 loan facilities merged to the aforemen-
tioned data sets and spans the years 2000-2007. We then randomly choose one loan facility
20As we later mention, we implement other measures of audit fees and the qualitative results are unchanged.
21We gather the following loan information from the DealScan database: the loan interest rate, the number
of lenders, the loan amount, whether the loan is secured or unsecured, whether the loan has financial or
general covenants, whether the loan has performance pricing, the type of loan (i.e., loan commitment, term
loan), the loan purpose, the loan seniority, and the distribution method (i.e., syndicated loan, sole lender loan).
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per year for each firm and arrive at a final sample of 2,971 loan facilities.22 We are limited
to this time span because the Audit Analytics database does not provide audit information
prior to 2000. In addition, we note that all dependent variables constructed from the Audit
Analytics, Compustat and CRSP data are lagged one fiscal year prior to the beginning of
the loan facility to ensure that the information was available to lenders when negotiating
loan contract terms.
Our empirical exercise uses this data sample to estimate the following model:
Yi,t = δ f eei,t−1+β′X +ωi+ γt + εi,t (1)
Equation (1) presents the general model describing the interest rate spread, the number of
lenders, and the maturity length of syndicated loans. The interest rate spread is the All-
In-Drawn Spread from the DealScan database, which is the loan interest rate spread over
LIBOR in basis points; the number of lenders is calculated as the log of number of lenders;
and the maturity length of the loan is the log of the maturity length in days. In equation
(1) the subscript i denotes the firm and the subscript t denotes the year. The dependent
variable Y is either the interest rate spread, the number of lenders, or the maturity length.
The matrix X includes independent variables dated t− 1, which serve as proxy for credit
risk and asymmetric information problems, and are standard from the literature (Strahan
1999, Carey, Post and Sharpe 1998, Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia 2002, Graham et al. 2007).
The error term is composed of three components: ωi, which is the firm-specific error term;
γt , the year-specific error term; and εi,t , a white noise error term.
We calculate our proxy for audit fees as total audit fees plus non-audit fees divided by total
assets. We use this measure to capture the possibility that firms compensate their auditors
for their auditing activities by purchasing additional non-audit-related consulting services.
For example, several studies suggest that firms may compensate auditing firms’ for bearing
additional litigation risk by purchasing additional services, such as tax preparation ser-
22Previous research follows this approach, for example, see Sufi (2007) and Ivashina (2008).
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vices.23
The observable risk characteristics in equation (1) that are included in X are intended to
capture banks’ pricing of risks related to credit risk and asymmetric information problems.
These variables include: a proxy for the firm size (log of total assets), the leverage ratio
(the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets), research and development
(research and development expense divided by total assets), dividends (total dividends di-
vided by total assets), current assets (current assets divided by total assets), the quick ratio
(current assets minus current liabilities all divided by total liabilities), Tobin’s average Q
(the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by total assets), cumu-
lative monthly stock returns from the previous fiscal year, and the standard deviation of
monthly stock returns from the previous fiscal year.24 In addition, we construct a proxy
for the firms’ Standard & Poor’s (S & P) domestic issuer rating, which takes on 23 values,
where the debt rating is more favorable for higher values of this indicator.25 We expect
control variables that capture greater (lesser) credit risk or asymmetric information prob-
lems to have the same (opposite) predicted associations with the dependent variables as
audit fees. We expect greater values of the debt rating, total assets, current assets, the quick
ratio, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), cumulative
stock returns, and Tobin’s average Q to be associated with less credit risk and asymmetric
information problems; and we expect an increase in research and development spending,
leverage, debt due in one year, and the standard deviation of stock returns to be associated
with greater credit risk and asymmetric information problems. We offer no predictions as to
how dividends should be associated with credit risk and asymmetric information problems.
The non-price loan terms capture how lenders use loan features to mitigate credit risk and
asymmetric information problems (Strahan 1999). These include an indicator for whether
23We also estimated all models using only audit-related fees divided by lagged total assets as our proxy for
audit fees, and results were qualitatively similar.
24Other studies examining the empirical determinants of loan contact terms include Carey, Post and Sharpe
(1998), Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002), Guner (2006) and Qian and Strahan (2007). Specific construction
of each variable is standard in the literature and included in the appendix.
25We set missing values of the debt rating equal to zero and generate an indicator variable equal to 1 when
the debt rating is not missing.
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or not the loan is secured, the log of the size of the loan facility, a dummy variable indicating
whether the loan facility has financial covenants, a dummy variable indicating whether the
loan facility has general covenants, and a dummy variable indicating whether a loan has
performance pricing. In addition, we construct indicators for the loan type and purpose.
Because we do not control for the endogeneity of loan contract terms, we do not offer any
coefficient predictions. For example, Strahan (1999) finds that interest rate spreads are
greater for secured loans, and Booth and Booth (2006) find that after controlling for the
endogeneity of a loan being secured, secured loans carry lower interest rate spreads.
Our main objective is to obtain empirical estimates of the association between the quantity
of auditing services and the dependent variables in equation (1). There are several compli-
cations to achieving this objective, which include: (1) we do not have data regarding the
quantity of auditing services; (2) audit fees may be endogenous to the dependent variables;
(3) audit fees may be measured with error; (4) audit fees may be correlated with uninten-
tionally omitted or unobservable variables that explain the dependent variables. Therefore,
we estimate equation (1) with instrumental variables generalized method of moments (IV-
GMM) to identify the effect in audit fees, due to an increase in the demand for auditing
services, on each dependent variable. IV-GMM parameter estimates are efficient and con-
sistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
To implement the estimator, we need instrumental variables that are expected to be as-
sociated with an increase in demand for auditing services and not the supply of auditing
services, correlated with audit fees, and uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1).
We rely on the theory of Dye (1993), which implies that the demand for audit services
depends on the benefits of more accurate accounting records, and the supply of audit fees
are a function of the cost of performing an audit and the expected litigation costs associ-
ated with an audit’s expected legal liability. Several studies suggest that audit liability is
greatest when an audited firm defaults on a debt obligation, often leaving the auditing firm
as the only entity with funds to reimburse creditors, which may suggest several proxies for
default risk may be suitable instrumental variables that may capture shifts in the supply
81
curve for audit fees. However, since default risk should influence the demand for more
accurate accounting records, these variables would likely be associated with a shift in the
demand curve for auditing services. Hence, variables capturing credit risk would not be
suitable instrumental variables for identifying shifts in the demand or supply of auditing
services. Therefore, we must choose another set of instrumental variables that are likely to
be associated with a shift in the demand curve for auditing services. We derive our instru-
mental variables from Dye’s implication that audit fees depend on the benefits of accurate
accounting records. Auditing clients wish to have an audit that provides a certain level of
assurance that financial statements are free from errors.
We also consider the assertion of Bell, Landsman and Shackelford (2001) and argue that
the quantity of auditing services is captured by the hours billed by auditors and the price of
auditing services is the hourly fee. Based on these assertions, it is reasonable to assume that
auditing clients purchase a given amount of audit hours to achieve a certain level of assur-
ance that accounting records are free from error. As previously mentioned, as variables that
capture the marginal benefit of assurance are likely to be associated with credit quality or
unobservable, we utilize variables that capture the need for clients to hire a greater number
of auditing hours to achieve a given level of assurance. In a sense, these instrumental vari-
ables capture an increase in the quantity of auditor hours demanded, holding the marginal
benefit of assurance constant. Our instruments include proxies for the scale of accounts
receivable and inventories, the number of operating segments, and dispersion of economic
activity among operating segments.
We justify accounts receivable and inventories based on the notion that auditors typically
sample a certain percentage of these accounts to provide a given level of assurance. Hence,
if a firm increases the scale of either of these items, holding all else constant, an audit
would require a larger sample and a greater number of auditor hours, thus an increase in
the quantity of auditing services purchased. We construct proxies for the scale of accounts
receivable as total accounts receivable divided by total assets and total inventories divided
by total assets. Instrumental variables are lagged to the fiscal year prior to the loan contract,
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concurrent with our audit fee proxy.
A second set of instrumental variables are based on the concept that more complex firms
must purchase a greater number of audit hours to achieve a given level of assurance that
accounting records are free from error. Our two proxies for complexity are the number
of operating segments that comprise a firm and a Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) of
sales among operating segments. If a firm has a greater number of segments, as stated by
Simunic (1984), firms must have accounting records verified for more “decision centers.”
In addition, if economic activity is more evenly dispersed among segments, then auditing
activities will have to be dispersed among more decision centers.
In order to provide assurance that our instruments are appropriate, they must not: (1) shift
the supply curve for auditing services (influence the marginal cost of providing an hour of
auditing services), (2) not be endogenous to loan contract terms, (3) must not have mea-
surement error correlated with the error term, (4) and must not be correlated with omitted
variables. We argue it is reasonable to assume that our instrumental variables are robust to
these potential problems. We argue that none of our variables influence the marginal cost
of providing an hour of auditing services, but instead capture firms’ increased demand for
hours to achieve a given level of assurance that accounting records are free from a material
error. We maintain that our instruments are not endogenous to loan contract terms because
the instruments are dated as of the fiscal year prior to the loan contract. In addition, it
is unlikely that measurement error in our instruments are correlated with the error terms.
Finally, we suggest that our variables are not correlated with any omitted variable because
previous examinations of the empirical determinants of loan contract terms typically do not
include these “readily available” variables as explanatory variables for loan contract terms.
Our host of other control variables, such as debt ratings and stock market valuations, likely
better capture the information these variables may contain for loan contract terms.
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4 Estimation Results
Before estimating equation (1) with instrumental variables with the IV-GMM method, we
estimate the model simply by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In OLS analysis we do
not include instrumental variables for audit fees, however we control for industry and year
effects and use robust standard errors clustered by firm. The results are presented in Table
1. In Column (1) we investigate the relation between all-in-drawn spread and the audit fees.
The results indicate that audit fees have a positive and statistically significant association
with loan interest rate spreads after controlling for firms’ observable risk characteristics and
non-price loan terms. Looking at the parameter estimates for the non-price loan terms in
column (1), we see a negative and significant relation between the deal amount and the all-
in-drawn spread. Similarly, the relation between number of lenders and the all-in-drawn
spread is negative and significant. A secured loan is more likely to get a higher interest
rate, whereas a loan that has performance pricing is more likely to get a lower interest
rate. Higher-term loans, revolvers, and takeovers are also associated with higher spreads.
Looking at the firm characteristics, we find that the lagged values of EBITDA, total assets,
Tobin’s average Q, sales, and firms’ debt rating are negatively related to the All-In-Drawn
Spread. An increase in leverage, cumulative stock returns and standard deviation of stock
returns are positively related to the all-in-drawn spread. This result appears to indicate that
audit fees are associated with greater credit risk and asymmetric information problems.
Table 1: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Audit Fee 26.9613*** 15.7969** -11.0665**
(6.563) (7.917) (5.573)
Deal Amount -0.0694*** 0.4082*** 0.0544***
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Maturity Length -0.0161
(0.027)
Number of Lenders -0.0447***
(0.016)
Secured/Unsecured 0.2947*** -0.1798*** 0.0316
(0.028) (0.035) (0.022)
Secured Dummy -0.0701** -0.0164 -0.0183
(0.028) (0.038) (0.026)
General Covenant Dummy 0.0572 0.2851*** 0.0847**
(0.040) (0.054) (0.037)
Financial Covenant Dummy 0.0288 -0.0256 -0.1353***
(0.032) (0.046) (0.031)
Perf. Pricing Dummy -0.0779*** 0.0783* 0.0474
(0.029) (0.043) (0.030)
Term Loan 0.4657*** 0.0186 1.2749***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.050)
Revolver/Line ≥ 1 Year 0.1377*** 0.1007*** 1.1752***
(0.045) (0.038) (0.033)
Takeover 0.1584*** -0.1735** -0.0186
(0.041) (0.074) (0.046)
Debt Repay. 0.0595* -0.1061* 0.1006**
(0.034) (0.057) (0.040)
EBITDA -0.8396*** 0.0768 0.2175
(0.138) (0.137) (0.135)
Total Assets -0.0419** 0.0436** -0.0102
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Tobin’s Average Q -0.0880*** -0.0176 -0.0013
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Sales -0.0254* 0.0303* -0.0003
(0.014) (0.018) (0.012)
Dividends -0.9138 -0.1101 0.5089
(0.607) (0.749) (0.400)
Leverage 0.3586*** 0.0460 -0.0116
(0.069) (0.092) (0.060)
Debt Due In One Year 0.0017 -0.0402 -0.0489
(0.061) (0.068) (0.042)
Cum. Stock Returns 0.1163** 0.0567 0.0923*
(0.049) (0.069) (0.053)
St. Dev. Stock Returns 0.7671*** -1.4146*** -0.1992
(0.188) (0.219) (0.167)
Debt Rating -0.1337*** -0.0103 -0.0191***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Debt Rating Dummy 1.6923*** 0.2184** 0.3187***
(0.079) (0.098) (0.065)
Constant 6.1612*** -6.6348*** 5.1110***
(0.318) (0.327) (0.286)
R2 0.7614 0.5817 0.6581
N 2971 2971 2971
* p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Next, in Column (2) we have the number of lenders as our dependent variable, and exam-
ine the effect of audit fees on the number of lenders. The coefficient on the audit fee is
positive and statistically significant. The number of lenders is positively related with audit
fees, consistent with the assertion that firms paying higher audit fees have lower asymmet-
ric information and/or lower credit risk, and can borrow from syndicates that have more
lenders. However, because the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates do not identify a
shift in either the demand or supply curve for auditing services, we cannot infer whether
or not the increase in audit fees is associated with an increase in the quantity of auditing
services. Examining the results for the observable risk chracteristics, total assets are gener-
ally associated with fewer asymmetric information problems and are positively associated
with the number of lenders. Interestingly, several observable risk characteristics have no
significant association with the number of lenders. Firm sales are also positively related to
the number of lenders, however the relation is negative for the variation in the stock returns
and the number of lenders. The non-price loan terms have some explanatory power for the
number of lenders. Revolver loans and the presence of general covenants and performance
pricing is positively associated with the number of lenders, while secured loans, takeover
and debt repayment loans have fewer lenders.
In column (3), we find a negative and significant relation between audit fees and maturity
length, which is consistent with Diamond (1991) and Flannery (1986) where borrowers
with high credit quality will issue short-term debt. Audit fees may be similar to the transac-
tion costs posited by Flannery (1986) or an observable signal used to determine borrower’s
riskiness as suggested by Diamond (1991). The observable characteristics of the firms do
not seem to matter very much for the determination of the maturity of the loan except for
asset size and debt rating. However, the non-price loan terms have a substantial effect on
the maturity. Higher term loans and revolvers, and loans that have general covenants are
more likely to be made for a longer maturity. However, loans that have financial covenants
are associated with shorter maturities.
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Our main estimation results are presented in Table 2, where we use GMM two-step estima-
tion with robust standard errors.26 In this specification we use all the instruments; accounts
receivable, inventories, number of operating segments, and HHI.27 In column (1) the all-in-
drawn spread is used as the dependent variable for the Equation (1). These results indicate
that audit fees have a negative and statistically significant association with loan interest
rate spreads. In addition, we note that audit fees retain significant explanatory power for
loan spreads after controlling for firms’ observable risk characteristics and non-price loan
terms. This is important because more accurate financial statements may only influence
loan terms through the weights banks place on information contained in the financial state-
ments. However, our result implies that audit fees may be associated with a reduction in
asymmetric information and credit risk beyond the more accurate information contained
in financial statement data. Moreover, the results indicate that audit fees are negatively
associated with loan spreads after controlling for credit risk, which could be a primary de-
terminant of audit fees because audit fees are likely to depend on legal liabilities that ensue
when borrowers are in financial distress. This result supports the assertion that, holding all
else constant, more precise financial statements are associated with greater expected future
profitability, hence, lower credit risk, and lower monitoring costs that need to be incurred
to overcome asymmetric information problems.
Table 2: GMM 2-Stage with All Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Audit Fee -63.6158** 65.9619 -45.8753
(31.964) (42.172) (30.271)
Deal Amount -0.0775*** 0.4108*** 0.0518***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017)
Continued on next page
26For the two step estimations we used the Stata’s routine by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2008).
27The first stage estimations are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B.
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Maturity Length -0.0308
(0.027)
Number of Lenders -0.0354**
(0.016)
Secured/Unsecured 0.3081*** -0.1845*** 0.0349
(0.025) (0.033) (0.022)
Secured Dummy -0.0722*** -0.0145 -0.0211
(0.027) (0.036) (0.025)
General Covenant Dummy 0.0488 0.2846*** 0.0827**
(0.041) (0.053) (0.038)
Financial Covenant Dummy 0.0339 -0.0293 -0.1295***
(0.034) (0.044) (0.030)
Perf. Pricing Dummy -0.0851*** 0.0842** 0.0405
(0.029) (0.042) (0.029)
Term Loan 0.4704*** 0.0249 1.2669***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.047)
Revolver/Line≥ 1 Year 0.1309*** 0.1137*** 1.1674***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.032)
Takeover 0.1743*** -0.1809** -0.0143
(0.043) (0.072) (0.046)
Debt Repay. 0.0521 -0.1016* 0.0983**
(0.036) (0.058) (0.040)
EBITDA -1.0171*** 0.1781 0.1382
(0.173) (0.161) (0.150)
Total Assets -0.0984*** 0.0761** -0.0322
(0.024) (0.031) (0.024)
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Tobin’s Average Q -0.0718*** -0.0262** 0.0052
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Sales -0.0048 0.0195 0.0070
(0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Dividends -0.5164 -0.3483 0.6242
(0.576) (0.716) (0.418)
Leverage 0.3867*** 0.0321 0.0049
(0.061) (0.083) (0.059)
Debt Due In One Year 0.0532 -0.0688 -0.0259
(0.061) (0.071) (0.047)
Cum. Stock Returns 0.1407*** 0.0416 0.0876*
(0.052) (0.067) (0.052)
St. Dev. Stock Returns 0.9744*** -1.5330*** -0.1420
(0.209) (0.225) (0.174)
Debt Rating -0.1277*** -0.0141** -0.0171***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Debt Rating Dummy 1.6122*** 0.2701*** 0.2943***
(0.075) (0.095) (0.063)
Constant 6.9549*** -7.0929*** 5.4117***
(0.406) (0.436) (0.350)
R2 0.7408 0.5758 0.6529
Hansen’s J p-value 0.8651 0.6155 0.2472
Under-iden. p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Endogeneity 0.0020 0.2250 0.2313
N 2971 2971 2971
* p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
90
Looking at the risk characteristics we see that firms’ observable risk characteristics have
explanatory power for loan spreads. Coefficient estimates are generally consistent with
expectations. Loan interest rate spreads are decreasing in firms’ total assets, Tobin’s av-
erage Q, and EBITDA, which are all variables typically associated with lower credit risk
and asymmetric information problems, while leverage and standard deviation of stock re-
turns, generally associated with greater credit risk and asymmetric information problems,
are positively associated with loan spreads. A better debt rating, which indicates a greater
ability and willingness to repay debt, also reduces credit risk and asymmetric information
problems, which results in lower interest rate spreads. For the non-price loan terms, an
increase in the number of lenders and having performance pricing is negatively associated
with loan spreads, while the presence of general or financial covenants are not significantly
associated with loan spreads. Also, higher term loans, revolvers and takeovers seem to be
positively related to the all-in-drawn spread. These results are all generally consistent with
previous research examining the empirical determinants of loan spreads.
Next, in column (2) we replicate our analysis; however, this time we use number of lenders
as our dependent variable. As can be seen in column (2), there is a positive but not sig-
nificant relation between the number of lenders and audit fees. This means audit fees do
not have any significant explanatory power. Looking at the firm characteristics, we see
that higher total assets are positively associated with number of lenders, whereas higher
Tobin’s average Q, more variables stock returns or higher debt rating imply a higher num-
ber of lenders. Looking at the non-price terms of the loans, we see that secured loans and
takeovers can have fewer lenders, while loans with general covenants, performance pricing
or revolver loans can have more lenders.
Afterward in column (3) we replicate our analysis by using maturity of the loan as our de-
pendent variable. We find a negative but not significant association between audit fees and
the maturity. Mots of the characteristics of the firms do not seem to matter for the maturity.
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Higher cumulative stocks returns imply a longer maturity but higher debt rating implies a
shorter maturity. Term loans and revolver loans are associated with longer maturities. Also,
if a loan has general covenants the maturity is longer, but if a loan has financial covenants
the maturity is shorter.
It is important to note that identification of the exogenous influence of audit fees on the
dependent variables relies on our instrumental variables being correlated with audit fees
and uncorrelated with the error terms in equation (1). In other words, our instrumental
variables must have reasonably potent correlation with audit fees in order to identify the
exogenous influence of auditing fees on the dependent variables. Therefore, we examine
the p-values from the test of under-identification to examine whether audit fees are reason-
ably correlated with our instrumental variables excluded from the second stage regression.
The null hypothesis in the test of under-identification is that the instrumental variables ex-
cluded from the first stage are not correlated with audit fees. We reject the null hypothesis
at the 1 percent level for all estimations in three columns. In order to make inferences as to
the possible correlation between the instrumental variables and the error terms in equation
(1), we examine the p-values for the test of over-identification. For the Hansen’s J test
of over-identification, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis at any reasonable level for all three
columns. In summary, we find no strong evidence rejecting the validity of our instrumental
variables.
We also implement an endogeneity test, where under the null hypothesis audit fees can be
treated as exogenous. For the estimation in column (1), we reject the null hypothesis, which
implies that audit fees are endogenous to the all-in-drawn spread, and using an instrumental
variables approach is relevant. However, checking the endogeneity test results in columns
(2) and (3), we fail to reject the null hypothesis that Audit Fees are exogenous to the number
of lenders and maturity. Since specification tests for the models presented in columns (2)
and (3) reject the hypothesis that audit fees are exogenous to interest rate spreads, we will
be unable to elaborate on the meaning of the parameter estimates in these columns.
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As can be seen from the first stage estimations are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B,
there is not a significant association between inventories and audit fees, and the number
of segments and accounts receivable seem to matter the most among other instruments.
Hence we replicate our analysis by using only number of segments and accounts receivable
as instruments. The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: GMM 2-Stage with Accounts Receivables and No. of
Segments
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Audit Fee -63.5671* 78.2227* -57.3611*
(33.009) (43.558) (31.256)
Deal Amount -0.0775*** 0.4110*** 0.0502***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017)
Maturity Length -0.0308
(0.027)
Number of Lenders -0.0354**
(0.016)
Secured/Unsecured 0.3080*** -0.1874*** 0.0366*
(0.025) (0.033) (0.022)
Secured Dummy -0.0722*** -0.0143 -0.0207
(0.027) (0.036) (0.025)
General Covenant Dummy 0.0489 0.2895*** 0.0840**
(0.041) (0.053) (0.039)
Financial Covenant Dummy 0.0339 -0.0309 -0.1327***
(0.034) (0.044) (0.030)
Perf. Pricing Dummy -0.0851*** 0.0837** 0.0411
(0.029) (0.042) (0.029)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Term Loan 0.4704*** 0.0286 1.2693***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.047)
Revolver/Line ≥ 1 Year 0.1309*** 0.1169*** 1.1651***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.032)
Takeover 0.1742*** -0.1823** -0.0102
(0.043) (0.072) (0.047)
Debt Repay. 0.0521 -0.0993* 0.0946**
(0.036) (0.058) (0.040)
EBITDA -1.0171*** 0.2129 0.1350
(0.173) (0.165) (0.151)
Total Assets -0.0983*** 0.0828*** -0.0376
(0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
Tobin’s Average Q -0.0718*** -0.0289** 0.0068
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Sales -0.0049 0.0161 0.0108
(0.014) (0.020) (0.013)
Dividends -0.5168 -0.3789 0.7087*
(0.579) (0.719) (0.429)
Leverage 0.3867*** 0.0287 0.0087
(0.061) (0.083) (0.060)
Debt Due In One Year 0.0532 -0.0758 -0.0217
(0.061) (0.071) (0.048)
Cum. Stock Returns 0.1407*** 0.0399 0.1016*
(0.052) (0.067) (0.053)
St. Dev. Stock Returns 0.9743*** -1.5601*** -0.1070
(0.209) (0.227) (0.176)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
Debt Rating -0.1277*** -0.0144** -0.0160***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Debt Rating Dummy 1.6123*** 0.2741*** 0.2766***
(0.076) (0.096) (0.065)
Constant 6.9144*** -7.1613*** 5.4813***
(0.413) (0.445) (0.353)
R2 0.7408 0.5727 0.6490
Hansen’s J p-value 0.6926 0.7260 0.4874
Under-iden. p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Endogeneity 0.0031 0.1408 0.1215
N 2971 2971 2971
* p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
The results in column (1) are in line with our previous findings that there is a negative and
significant relationship between audit fees and all-in-drawn spread. The significance of the
variables for the risk characteristics of the firms and the non-price terms of the loans do
not change. The results in columns (2) and (3) are substantially different from our previous
table. In column (2) where we have the number of lenders as our dependent variable,
and the coefficient on the audit fee is positive and statistically significant. The number of
lenders is positively related with the audit fee, consistent with the assertion that firms that
pay higher audit fees have less asymmetric information and/or lower credit risk, and can
borrow from syndicates that have more lenders. In column (3), where we have the number
of lenders as our dependent variable, we find a negative and significant relation between
the audit fee and the maturity length.
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Next, we check for the under-identification test, and reject the the null hypothesis that
the instrumental variables excluded from the first stage are not correlated with audit fees
for all three columns. For the Hansen’s J test of over-identification, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Checking for
the endogeneity, we find that audit fees cannot be treated as exogenous to the all-in-drawn
spread as can be seen in column (1). However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the audit fees are exogenous to the number of lenders and the maturity as can be seen in
columns (2) and (3).
So, we argue that since audit fees can be treated as exogenous, the estimation results in
Table 1 where we do not employ instrumental variables is relevant, and there is a positive
association between audit fees and number of lenders, and there is a negative association
between audit fees and maturity, which is consistent with the argument that an exogenous
increase in audit fees is associated with an decrease in credit risk and asymmetric infor-
mation problems. However, as mentioned earlier, the results do not allow us to discern a
specific interpretation of these result. Moreover, when comparing these results to those in
Table 2 or Table 3, it may seem that we should assert our results provide mixed inferences
regarding whether un-instrumented audit fees are associated with an increase or decrease
in credit risk and asymmetric information problems. However, we remind the reader that
we reject the null hypothesis that audit fees are exogenous to the interest rate spread, but
not the number of lenders or the maturity.
5 Conclusion
Our estimation results support the view that increases in audit fees are driven by audit
clients’ demand for more accurate financial statements, which implies a lower likelihood of
material accounting errors, resulting in a decline in credit risk and asymmetric information
problems in the syndicated loan market. In addition, our results are consistent with the ra-
tionale that firms find it beneficial to pay for the production of information that can be used
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by anyone at zero cost, and that lenders in the syndicated loan market find this information
credible. We interpret our results as suggesting that borrowers find it economically ad-
vantageous to substitute banks’ monitoring with information production by auditing firms.
Possibly this information could also be used by many financial market participants other
than banks. In addition, our results suggest that audits serve the purpose stated in the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934: that audits are intended to mitigate asymmetric information
problems in financial markets.
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Appendix A: Variable Construction
• All-In-Drawn Spread: Taken directly from DealScan database
• Number of Lenders: Log of 1 + number of lenders from DealScan
• Maturity Length: Log of maturity length of loan in days from DealScan
• Deal Amount: Log of deal amount in dollars from DealScan
• Secured/Unsecured Dummy: Equal to 1 if loan is secured, and equal to 0 if loan is
unsecured or secured status is missing, from DealScan
• Covenant Dummy: Equal to 1 if loan has either general or financial covenants, from
DealScan
• Performance Pricing Dummy: Equal to 1 if loan has performance pricing from
DealScan
• Debt Rating: Compustat item280, takes on increasing values beginning with least
favorable rating and running to most favorable rating
• Research and Development: Compustat item45/item6
• Leverage: Compustat (item9 + item34)/item6
• Total Assets: Compustat log(item6)
• Current Assets: Compustat item4/data5
• Quick Ratio: Compustat (item1 + item238 + .6*item2)/item5
• EBITDA: Compustat (item12+item14)/item6
• Debt Due in One Year: Compustat item44/(item9 + item34)
• Dividends: Compustat (item19 + item21)/item6
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• Tobin’s Average Q: Compustat (item199*item25 + item9 + item34)/item6
• Cumulative Stock Returns: Cumulative stock returns from previous fiscal year from
CRSP, stock return is firm’s daily stock return minus CRSP daily value weighted
index return
• Cumulative Stock Returns: Standard deviation of daily stock returns from previous
fiscal year, stock return is firm’s daily stock return minus CRSP daily value weighted
index return
103
Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table 5: First Stage - All Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
No of Segments 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Accounts Receivable 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inventory -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deal Amount -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maturity Length -0.0001**
(0.000)
Number of Lenders 0.0001**
(0.000)
Secured/Unsecured 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secured Dummy -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
General Covenant Dummy -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial Covenant Dummy 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Perf. Pricing Dummy -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Term Loan 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revolver/Line ≥1 Year -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Takeover 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt Repay. -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0082*** 0.0069*** 0.0069***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EBITDA -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Assets -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s Average Q 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dividends 0.0043** 0.0042** 0.0042**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt Due In One Year 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cum. Stock Returns 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All-in-Drawn Spread No. of Lenders Maturity
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
St. Dev. Stock Returns 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt Rating 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt Rating Dummy -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.4751 0.4741 0.4741
N 2971 2971 2971
* p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
All-In-Drawn Spread 4.599838 0.8650443 2.140066 7.279319
Audit Fee 0.0018273 0.0018588 0 0.0108805
HHI 3935.699 1950.317 1118.812 10000
No of Segments 5.845843 3.120012 1 13
Accounts Receivable 0.1560044 0.1125952 0 0.6199169
Inventory 0.1373406 0.134155 0 0.6919741
Deal Amount 19.24848 1.331465 12.57097 23.90132
Maturity Length 7.038647 0.6680322 4.997212 7.980023
Number of Lenders 1.877628 0.902066 0 3.526361
Secured/Unsecured 0.3749579 0.4841935 0 1
Secured Dummy 0.6415348 0.4796304 0 1
General Covenant Dummy 0.6334567 0.4819414 0 1
Financial Covenant Dummy 0.721306 0.4484321 0 1
Perf. Pricing Dummy 0.5503198 0.4975452 0 1
Term Loan 0.1403568 0.3474153 0 1
Revolver/Line 0.6667789 0.4714442 0 1
Takeover 0.0531807 0.2244315 0 1
Debt Repay. 0.0508246 0.2196764 0 1
EBITDA 0.0875186 0.0865302 -0.9058682 0.3407702
Total Assets 7.371733 1.673136 2.030251 10.84494
Tobin’s Average Q 1.811702 1.032384 0.6344355 9.489656
Sales 1.22772 0.7977768 0.0192308 4.420817
Dividends 0.0115696 0.019575 0 0.1539757
Leverage 0.2738354 0.1695324 0.0000247 1.036439
Debt Due In One Year 0.1014618 0.1766776 0 1
Cum. Stock Returns 1.03483 0.1711 0.3562049 2.436053
St. Dev. Stock Returns 0.1078873 0.0653614 0.0041521 0.7240801
Debt Rating 8.831706 7.560972 0 23
Debt Rating Dummy 0.6068664 0.4885283 0 1
N 2971
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